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ABSTRACT ESSAY 1
RAPID OVER-REACTION: PERCEIVED VALUE CREATION VIA ALLIANCE
ANNOUNCEMENTS
by
Matthias Bollmus
The University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee, 2013
Under the Supervision of Professor Edward Levitas

The management literature has widely acknowledged the importance of studying and
understanding the determinants of the market’s reactions to the announcements of
strategic alliances. With a focus on dyadic alliances, I ask what types of information
signaled to the market by the alliance announcement influence the investors’ perception
of value. I hypothesize that the type of technical expertise, relationship expertise, and
market expertise of each alliance partner, expressed as either explorative or exploitative,
sends decodable signals to the investors, which in turn influences their reaction to the
new alliance announcement. Using a sample of 927 alliances extracted from a unique
biopharmaceutical dataset, I proxied investors’ reaction to the alliance announcements by
calculating the cumulative abnormal return during a three-day window around the
alliance announcement. I found that while technical expertise does not appear to be a
signal that investors consider when valuing firms involved in a new alliance, both
relationship expertise and market expertise showed a statistically significant influence on
the investors’ perception of value.
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ABSTRACT ESSAY 2:
REDUCING INVESTOR ANXIETY VIA ALLIANCE PARTNER SELECTION
by
Matthias Bollmus
The University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee, 2013
Under the Supervision of Professor Edward Levitas

The management literature has recognized strategic alliances as an organizational
form that has the potential to reduce uncertainty. One important step for alliances in order
to achieve a reduction in uncertainty is selecting the right partner, one that enables the
alliance to effectively address the specific type of uncertainty it faces. In this study, I
specifically address the question of whether the perceived uncertainty of investors at the
time of the alliance announcement is influenced by whether the skills and expertise of the
two alliance partners are similar or complementary (diverse). I suggest that the level of
technical expertise, expressed as either explorative or exploitative and interpreted as
either similar or complementary, sends a signal to the investors, which in turn will impact
their perception of uncertainty. In addition, I study whether this relationship is moderated
by the level of exogenous uncertainty faced by the alliance. Using a sample of 927
alliances extracted from a unique biopharmaceutical dataset, I found that exogenous
uncertainty in fact moderates the relationship between partner similarity/
complementarity and investors’ perception of uncertainty.
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ABSTRACT ESSAY 3:
SPILLOVER EFFECTS IN ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS
by
Matthias Bollmus
The University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee, 2013
Under the Supervision of Professor Edward Levitas

Entering multiple simultaneous alliances is a common practice, especially in R&D
intense industries. While this strategy may enhance the possibility of success by
attempting to simultaneously unlock possible synergistic effects in multiple alliances, it
also exposes the alliance partners to spillover effects created by their partners’ alliances.
In this study I will examine how one specific action of one partner, to enter a new
alliance, affects the initial alliance partner. Specifically, given that firm A and firm B are
in an existing alliance, how will the market react to the information that firm A has
entered into a new alliance with firm C, and how will the market reaction affect firm B
(the initial alliance partner)? I develop and test two sets of competing hypotheses using a
unique biopharmaceutical dataset and find that the market reacts favorably to the new
alliance as measured by the change in value of firm B’s stock price. My goal is to
contribute to the literature by testing how the signals sent by the alliance to the market
affect the initial alliance partner and thus if investors monitor and react to post-alliance
events.
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1

RAPID OVER-REACTION: PERCEIVED VALUE CREATION VIA ALLIANCE
ANNOUNCEMENTS

2

INTRODUCTION
Studies have shown that investors generally react positively to an initial alliance
announcement (Dyer, Kale, & Singh, 2001; Shah & Swaminathan, 2008). However, these
initial expectations are often not realized in that alliances fail to generate subsequent
desired and expected returns (Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002). These findings point to the
uncertainty faced by investors when making predictions as to how alliances will perform
at the time of the alliance announcement, and how to assess the value of the partners. It is
this investor reaction to the alliance at the time of the alliance announcement that is the
focus of this study.
What causes investors to react to an alliance announcement, what signals are sent by
the alliance, and how are these signals decoded by investors? With a focus on dyadic
alliances, I specifically look at the skills and expertise of the alliance partners, which I
suggest send signals to the investors. Specifically, I ask whether three specific types of
signals that I have identified influence the investors’ perception of value.
I investigate how the degree of technical, relationship, and market expertise of the
two partner firms in the focal alliance sends a signal to investors, which in turn triggers
the investor’s reaction. Equally important, I examine how reactions vary along multiple
components forming the explore/exploit dichotomy. Unlike previous research which has
viewed exploration and exploitation along technological similarities, I will study the
concepts of exploration and exploitation along many dimensions of the value chain. I
chose the dimension of exploration and exploitation because I suggest that explorative
and exploitative expertise send very rich signals to the investors, meaning that said
signals carry information that investors decode and act upon. Exploration and
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exploitation provide an effective base on which to assess investor reactions, since their
definitions are premised on the degree to which firm activity diverges with previous
activity and thus causes reassessment by investors at the time of the alliance
announcement.
My research question is as follows: what information signaled to the investors by the
alliance announcement creates a perception of value and subsequently triggers investor
reaction as measured by the change in market value of one of the alliance partners? I will
focus on three areas of partner and alliance expertise (technical expertise, relationship
expertise, and market expertise) and state those in terms of exploratory or exploitative
expertise. I will note that I am not considering the explorative or exploitative level of
each individual firm, but rather that all three expertise, and the level of exploration /
exploitation depend on the specific partner combination.
I code technical expertise as explorative or exploitative based on patent citation
overlap. Explorative expertise is based on a low patent citation overlap (suggesting that
the combined technical expertise by the partners is exploratory since the partner firms
cite patents that are very different from each other), and exploitative expertise is based on
a high value of patent citation overlap (suggesting that the expertise brought into the
alliance by one partner is not that unique and new to the other partner as evidenced by a
higher number of common patent citations). Relationship expertise is considered
explorative when the two alliance partners have little or no, and possibly unrelated, prior
experience in working with each other (e.g., if they have worked with each other but on a
different type of alliance, or a long time ago, etc.). If they have relevant and/or recent
work experience with each other, the relationship expertise would be considered
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exploitative. Finally, market expertise refers to the alliance partners’ documented
experience and skill in bringing a new product to market prior to the focal relationship.
Relatively little prior experience will be coded as explorative, while significant prior
experience would be coded exploitative.
The basic premises of my hypotheses are that investors will decode and react to
signals sent by the alliance. As such, these signals frame the investors’ perception of
value. The investors’ reaction is based on the context in which exploration or exploitation
occurs, as well as the investors’ perception of how it will affect the future performance
and returns of the alliance.
While exploration is usually associated with higher potential returns, I suggest that
this does not always lead to higher value as perceived by investors when examined across
all three constructs (technical, relationship, and marketing). Exploiting an existing
competency could also lead to measurable returns. If investors display a preference for
lower but more probable return over a more risky but potentially very high return, it will
shape the investors’ perception of value. Therefore, investors could theoretically react
either positively or negatively to an alliance that focuses predominately on exploration or
exploitation within two of the three dimensions that I have defined, while in the context
of the third dimension (market expertise) I suggest that the investors’ reaction is more
predictable (although not certain).
This study contributes to the literature by furthering the understanding of
determinants of investors’ perception of value of alliance formations. This, I suggest, will
increase our understanding of investor reaction to alliance formation which, given the
many overvaluations at the time of the announcement, is needed. By studying what
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factors may contribute to investors’ (positive) reaction to the alliance announcement I
aim to offer suggestions on which factors to further study. A linear mixed model
regression analysis using a sample of 927 biopharmaceutical alliances will test my
hypotheses.
The following section provides an overview of the literature and theory of alliance
formation, leading to the hypotheses that I will test in this paper. Subsequent sections
show the empirical analyses and discussion of the findings. The paper concludes with a
discussion of the implications and limitations of this study.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Alliances may be defined as formal cooperative agreements between two or more
organizations involving the pooling or trading of resources, linked together with or
without equity. Alliances differ along many dimensions, and one main difference is the
purpose for which alliances are formed. This may include one or more of the following:
facilitation of economic exchanges (Anand & Khanna, 2000), organizational learning
(Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996), product marketing (Swaminathan & Moorman,
2009) or product innovation (Rothaermel, 2001a).
In addition to the purpose of the alliance, the literature has also recognized several
levels on which alliances can help strengthen a firm’s competitive position, such as by
gaining access to new capabilities (Oxley & Sampson, 2004; Rothaermel & Boeker,
2008), access to new markets (Chen & Chen, 2002; Koka & Prescott, 2008), access to
new assets (Huggins, 2010; Li, Eden, Hitt, & Ireland, 2008) including new knowledge
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(Walter, Lechner, & Kellermanns, 2007), and enhanced reputation (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas,
Arregle, & Borza, 2000), to name a few.
Because investors are looking for a way to recognize competitive advantages and
future value, they are attempting to decode and interpret observable signals. In particular,
explorative and exploitative signals lend itself for easier decoding and interpretation by
investors because they each signal a distinct strategic direction of the organization.
Exploration and exploitation
March (1991) defines exploration as searching, risk taking, discovery, innovation, and
experimentation. Others would associate exploration with investment, building new
capabilities, and entering new lines of business (Koza & Lewin, 1999), and some would
define it simply as the pursuit of new knowledge (Rothaermel, 2001b). The term
exploitation on the other hand more commonly refers to refinement, efficiency,
production, selection and implementation (March, 1991). Firms that engage in
exploitation are thought of as entities that focus more on economies of scale, using
existing processes and knowledge to refine a product or process, but certainly do not
consistently take high risk and explore the unknown. Some scholars have suggested that
the strategic decision to explore or exploit is a trade-off decision (March, 2006); within
one firm, one might prevent the other (Benner & Tushman, 2002; Sull, 1999).
However, it has also been suggested that entities might have to possess relevant skill
to engage in both, exploring and exploiting, in order to be consistently successful (e.g. the
ambidexterity argument) (Zi-Lin He & Poh-Kam Wong, 2004). Because of this
(perceived) need to do both, exploring and exploiting, an alliance might be the ideal
organizational structure that allows each firm to mainly focus on exploration or
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exploitation, while the alliance as an entity has the ability to focus on both. I therefore
state my hypotheses in terms of the combined expertise of both alliance partners, which
then equals the expertise of the alliance. I identified three overarching areas containing
relevant exploration / exploitation variables for this study: technical expertise,
relationship expertise, and market expertise.
Alliances are capable of producing both explorative and exploitative innovations
(Dewar & Dutton, 1986). Both explorative and exploitative innovations have the
potential to affect the valuation of an alliance, although this shift in value is realized
differently. Explorative innovations, the more risky approach according to March (1991),
seek to significantly shift the basis of competition within an industry (Ireland, Hitt, &
Sirmon, 2003). In this regard, an explorative innovation could radically shift power
within an industry and catapult a firm to the top. It is a risky strategy, and in some regards
similar to an “all or nothing” approach. If successful it might positively affect the
trajectory of profits for the foreseeable future.
Exploitative innovations on the other hand are designed to help maximize existing
capabilities (Sheremata, 2004). As a result, this strategy is less risky, and it has almost no
chance of significantly affecting the competitive position of a firm within an industry,
either positively or negatively, in the short run. However, exploitation should not be
interpreted as the less-desirable strategy but rather as a different strategic direction; this
might appeal to some investors. Because of the differing potential outcomes between
exploration and exploitation, I suggest that the investor reaction based on these signals
sent by the alliance will differ.
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Since exploration entails production of new knowledge and exploitation entails reuse,
I examine how these approaches affect investor perceptions. Because alliances are
designed to be able to engage in both exploration and exploitation, both may play a
crucial part in a firm’s overall strategic direction. Subsequently, investors may see this
and base their initial reaction to the alliance announcement on their assessment of how
well an alliance is prepared to take advantage of any synergistic effects for which it was
created.
Previous work on performance perception of alliances has focused largely on the
signals that firms send to other potential partner-firms before the alliance is formed (the
partner selection process). Partner selection issues in alliances have been studied
extensively (Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004; Dollinger, Golden, & Saxton, 1997;
Hitt et al., 2000; Kale & Singh, 2009; Shah & Swaminathan, 2008). However, the
literature has not focused as much on the issue of partner-specific skill sets (i.e. the
combined set of expertise and skills) and the subsequent investor reaction to the signals
sent to exogenous entities (i.e., investors).
In an effort to more accurately predict the success of an alliance, prior studies have
focused on several variables impacting alliance performance with a focus on resources
that the partners bring into the alliance (Saxton, 1997). For example, alliance experience
of a firm (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Dyer & Singh, 1998), reputation (Barney, 1991; R.
Hall, 1992), or patent filings (Levitas & McFadyen, 2009), to name a few, have generally
been viewed as predictors of future alliance success. Investors receive and decode signals
in these variables. Therefore, once the alliance is announced, a desirable combination of
partners can support the perception by investors that the alliance will act synergistically,
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which would result in an increase in performance (Dyer et al., 2001). This in turn would
explain the generally positive market reaction to alliance announcements.
Upon the announcement, investors identify, or at least believe that they have the
ability to identify, the potential for future performance and reward the announcement
with an appropriate reaction (positive or negative, depending on the investors’
interpretation of the signals). However, even though alliance announcements are
generally met with a positive market reaction (Shah & Swaminathan, 2008), alliances
also carry a significant risk in the form of failure to generate the positive effects they
were designed and expected to create (i.e., a product with market success that will
generate positive cash flows). Research suggests that a significant number of alliances, in
fact between 30% and 70%, fail or are prematurely terminated (Bamford, GomesCasseres, & Robinson, 2003; Lunnan & Haugland, 2008), leading to a destruction of
shareholder value for the alliance partners (Kale et al., 2002). While alliance failure rates
are not the focus of this study, these statistics underline the fact that because investors
appear to positively over-react to the alliance announcements, more research into this
subject is warranted. In other words, the question of what the alliance partners signal that
gets the investors excited is relevant.
One of the main problems with evaluating the alliance at the time of the alliance
announcement is the fact that the exogenous parties, the investors, have to overcome
information asymmetry. The investors therefore rely on signals from the alliance (its
member partners) before they, the investors, can react either positively or negatively to
the announcement. Signaling theory (Spence, 1973; Spence, 1974) provides the
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theoretical foundation for my study because it helps explain investor reaction to the
alliance announcement in this environment of information asymmetry.
Exploration and exploitation affect the investors’ perception of the alliance, and
subsequently its value, very differently. On a very basic level, I suggest that exploration
signals a willingness to take risks, to change the current norm, and to seek new
discoveries. These attitudes communicate a willingness to change the status quo, which in
turn may cause investors to re-assess their previous valuation of a firm. Exploitation, on
the other hand, may allow for a more consistent valuation because of the lack of any
drastic changes. Exploitation generally does not attempt to change a status-quo in the
short term, but rather focuses on strengthening existing capabilities. Those are two very
different strategic directions, and I suggest that the alliances’ intention on which direction
to take is signaled to the investors at the time of the announcements (when the partnercombination is revealed). The new partner combination then forces investors to react.
Signaling theory states that even though the exogenous entities (e.g., investors) might
not be able to fully understand exactly what the new alliance will do (meaning that
information asymmetry exists), they will receive and interpret signals sent by the alliance
partners, and subsequently consider the signals’ influence on the valuation of the alliance
partners. This also suggests that alliance partners, knowing that investors may not be able
to fully understand what the alliance will do (that is, how it will create value), have the
opportunity to send very select signals that support a potential over-valuation at the time
of the announcement. In this study, I will examine how the signals that I identified to be
relevant are deciphered by the investors. I use the investors’ immediate reaction around
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the time of the alliance announcement (t=[-1, 0, 1]) as a proxy for their interpretation of
the signals.
As mentioned above, finding the right partner is a critical step in leading an alliance
onto a path toward future success. A significant number of studies have addressed the
issue of partner selection, especially on partner skills and resource complementarity
(Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 2001; Ohmae, 1989). The concept of
complementary skills specifically refers to different skills that partners bring into the
alliance, with the assumption that one partner’s different skills such as abilities,
knowledge, organizational design, experience, etc., are then strategically used to offset
possible weaknesses of the other partner. I am assuming that alliance partners make a
strategic decision on which partner to choose, with the result that the corresponding
partner combination of skills does not result by chance. Rather a conscious decision led
to the specific combination. These decisions are observed, and the final selection of
partners is then interpreted and acted upon by investors.
Technical Expertise
It has been suggested that inputs carry a signal to the investors about the potential
future results of the alliance (Ahuja & Morris Lampert, 2001). The investors observe the
inputs, come to a conclusion about potential outputs, and react long before potential
outputs could lead to measurable profits. As a result, I create a variable that encompasses
inputs of different dimensions of technical expertise of the two alliance partners.
In this study I will consider whether the technical expertise of the partners, proxied by
the resources the partners bring into the alliance in the form of patents, are explorative or
exploitative. Technical expertise refers to a firm’s understanding of the technology
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underlying its goods or services (Grant, 1996), and patents are a proxy for technical
expertise. I will use the relative, partner specific, technological overlap of the combined
inputs, the patent citations, as an indication of whether the technical expertise of the
alliance is exploratory or exploitative.
However, it is not clear exactly how the investors interpret the signals. As outlined
above, both exploration and exploitation can lead to value creation in the future, which
would manifest itself through perceived value at the time of the alliance announcement
(i.e. the investor reaction). The question becomes which type of value creation
(explorative or exploitative) the investor is looking for, and how much risk the investor is
willing to take. A positive reaction to an alliance featuring either exploratory inputs or
exploitative inputs is possible, because the reaction is somewhat subjective. As a result, I
suggest two competing hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1A: The higher the degree of combined explorative technical expertise of
the alliance partners, the higher the investors’ perception of value
Hypothesis 1B: The higher the degree of combined exploitative technical expertise of
the alliance partners, the higher the investors’ perception of value
Relationship expertise
When investors consider the specific partners involved in an alliance, they are
interested in partner combinations that have the potential to reach explicitly stated or
implied future performance goals (e.g., form an alliance with the goal of developing a
cancer treatment). I identify three reasons that the degree to which alliance partners know
each other may influence the achievement of a goal and subsequently the alliance
performance, and thus will impact the investors’ perception of the value creation of a new
alliance at the time of the announcement.
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First: efficient knowledge transfer. A stronger familiarity with the alliance partner
increases the efficiency of knowledge transfer (Cohen, 2009; Kogut & Zander, 1992;
Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1998). In other words, certain alliance partner
combinations signal to the investors that they, the alliance partners, have the potential
ability to communicate and transfer vital information between each other efficiently.
Second: knowledge of organizational routines. Prior alliance experience can potentially
reduce inefficiencies between the partners because the partners are familiar with, for
example, each other’s routines and culture, and can thus reduce transaction costs
(Beckman et al., 2004; Parkhe, 1993). In other words, this combination of alliance
partners has the potential to get the job done more efficiently, or without significant loss
of resources. Third: trust. Prior experience with each other increases trust, which in turn
will reduce the firms’ temptation to act unilaterally and, at the same time, increase the
likelihood that partners will share crucial information with each other in a timely manner
(Li et al., 2008). The question therefore is: do the partners know each other, and if so,
how well?
Based on these relationship indicators, I suggest that the degree to which alliance
partners know each other (and know how the other partner works) will trigger an investor
response. Li et al. (2008) suggested that there are three different types of firms from
which to choose an alliance partner, and which signal to the market whether the
relationship is explorative (new) or exploitative (not new). Those categories of partners
are: close friend, acquaintance or stranger (Li et al., 2008). Friends are firms with which
the focal firm has worked in the recent past and has done so more than once.
Acquaintances are partners with which the focal firm has worked before, but not recently
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and not continuously. In the context of partner relationships, both friends and
acquaintances may be categorized as exploitative partner choices. Strangers are partner
firms with which the focal firm has not worked before, and as a result on which it has
very limited (only secondary) information. Selecting a stranger as alliance partner would
be considered an explorative partner choice.
In this study I will consider three specific variables that in their own way address the
issue of relationships status. All three variables proxy the likelihood of information
asymmetry between partners, which has the potential to lead to inefficiencies. The
potential for inefficiencies may be viewed as a negative signal by investors at the time of
the alliance announcement. Number of prior partnerships will address specifically how
often the partners have worked together in the past. Time proximity to last partnership
introduces a time component; if the partners have recently worked together it would
suggest that organizational routines as well as the external environment have changed
less than if the last time both partners worked together was well in the past. Time
proximity would suggest that both partners would have to expend fewer resources to
align organizational routines. Thus, the longer the time horizon since the last partnership,
the greater the possibility that inefficiencies might occur. Third, since there are different
types of alliances (e.g., marketing, R&D, etc.), the investors’ reaction to the alliance
announcement should consider the partners’ relevant history in the type of the focal
alliance. Therefore, the alliance-type specific partner experience is the third variable of
consideration.
Exploitation, calculated across the three dimensions I suggested, would refer to a
scenario where the partners know each other well and signal to the investors that there is
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a potential for efficiencies based on a prior relationship. Simply put, the partners know
each other well, have “done it” before, and are willing and able to capitalize on the
potential synergies that the relationship offers. This could be interpreted as a positive
signal, which would have the potential to trigger a positive investor reaction.
While it is true that firms are likely to call upon previous alliance partners (Gulati,
1995; Uzzi, 1997), this does not necessarily suggest that working with a new partner
doesn’t offer benefits as well. An explorative relationship can offer other benefits, such
as the possibility of reducing inertial tendencies between partners (Sx & Rowley, 2002).
Inertia between partners who have a history of working with each other might set in, and
as a result the alliance partners might not be able or willing to implement necessary
changes to, for example, the strategic approach to a given problem. Especially in
industries like the pharmaceutical industry, breaking away from an existing relationship
might carry benefits that the alliance would signal to investors. As a result, it might be the
fact that an alliance consist of partners that have not worked together before (who would
be categorized as strangers) that sends the desired signals to the investors.
Because alliances that are explorative with respect to relationship expertise, as well as
those that are exploitative, have potential benefits and drawbacks, investors could
potentially react positively to either partner choice. Either choice of partner carries a
signal. Exploitative partner selection (close friends or acquaintances) signal efficiencies.
Explorative partner (strangers) selection reduces the potential for inertia, which could
also signal efficiencies. Because a reaction suggesting perceived value recognition by the
investor could be triggered by either an explorative or exploitative partner choice, I
suggest two competing hypotheses:
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Hypothesis 2A: The higher the degree of combined explorative relationship expertise
of the alliance partners, the higher the investors’ perception of value.
Hypothesis 2B: The higher the degree of combined exploitative relationship expertise
of the alliance partners, the higher the investors’ perception of value.
Market expertise
Whereas in the biopharmaceutical industry technical expertise specifically refers to an
alliance’s ability to generate or create the desired therapy, the market expertise variable
specifically addresses the alliance’s ability to navigate the therapy through the process
and into the market where, ultimately, profits are expected to be generated. Therefore,
this area of expertise might also send a strong and relevant signal to investors, who are
attempting to detect and forecast future profits.
One ultimate goal of an alliance may be to produce a marketable product that will
positively affect future cash flows. In the pharmaceutical industry, any product has to be
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (hereafter: FDA) before it can be
marketed and sold in the United States. The FDA approval process is complicated and
resource consuming. It is therefore critical that firms that plan to have a new patent
approved for sale by the FDA understand the distinct FDA approval process. The process
consists of six critical approval stages, each designed to expose a different sample to the
drug 1. Along each stage, the firm has to prove that the drug actually does what it
advertises; in other words, if a drug is said to reduce the risk for cancer, a study involving
humans has to eventually prove this claim before the FDA would approve the drug.

1

I divide the drug development process in to six stages: (1) preclinical stage, (2) the filing of an
Investigational New Drug Application (or a Biologic License Application), (3) Phase 1, (4) Phase 2, (5)
Phase 3, and (6) marketed
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Organizational capabilities, such as learning, play a large role in generating superior
performance (Nelson & Winter, 1982). The best way to learn the FDA approval process
is by going through it and gaining expertise, or partnering with someone that has
extensive experience in the process. The experience curve would suggest that efficiencies
improve with experience; the direct experience is invaluable (Sampson, 2005). As a
result, I suggest that alliance partners that have experience with the specific process will
be more efficient in managing the process.
However, while the ability to manage the FDA approval process is absolutely vital, it
is not enough to be successful. In other words, investors are looking for additional signals
that would suggest that the alliance deserves a positive reaction at the time of the
announcement. Complementary assets, defined as assets, infrastructure or capabilities
vital to the success of a project, are needed to be successful; complementary assets can
propel a firm from having failed despite experience in the FDA process, to having
experienced success. Tripsas (1997) specifically states that commercial performance,
which investors are interested in, hinges on the organizational structure’s ability to use
complementary assets. The alliance is again an organizational structure that allows for the
relatively easy introduction of these assets into the partnership by simply choosing a
partner that has the desired expertise.
In this study, I pay special attention to the degree of FDA approval process
experience and FDA approval success by the partners. Process experience would suggest
that a partner has at least tried to get a therapy approved and, therefore, has some
experience with the bureaucratic and scientific hurdles that this process encompasses.
Having had success in the FDA approval process, however, is rare; between 2003 and
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2010 only about 10% of all drugs submitted were actually approved by the FDA
(Business Wire, 2011).
Together, having all necessary assets to have experience and success, creates a
construct that sends a signal to exogenous entities about specific FDA approval process
experience. Rationally the investors should value experience in this category. However,
to make sure I also test the scenario in which the alliance does not have experience in
bringing a product to market:

Hypothesis 3A: The higher the degree of combined explorative market expertise of the
alliance partners, the higher the investors’ perception of value.
Hypothesis 3B: The higher the degree of combined exploitative market expertise of
the alliance partners, the higher the investors’ perception of value.

METHODOLOGY
Sample
I am using a sample of bilateral alliances that include biotech firms and
pharmaceutical companies. I coded them as Client and R&D to indicate the relationship,
where generally the larger pharmaceutical company represents the Client firm and the
smaller biotech firm represents the R&D partner. I chose this industry because alliances
are a very common organizational form, where partners are likely to work with each
other numerous times. In addition, this industry relies heavily on patent protection for its
products. As outlined above, patent citations send very rich signals about the technical
expertise of the alliance partners.

19

All patent information was obtained from the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) Patent Citations database (B. H. Hall, Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & Centre for Economic
Policy Research (Great Britain), 2001), and the United States Patent and Trademark
Office’s (USPTO) Cassis database. Additional data was taken from Compustat data files,
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) U.S. stock database, the Recombinant
Capital Biotechnology Database (ReCap), the IMS R&D Focus database, Spectrum
Institutional Ownership files, and United States Securities and Exchange (SEC) proxy
(DEF 14a) filings.
The initial sample included 28,470 biopharmaceutical alliances established between
January 1st, 1989 and December 31st, 2008. I used the Wharton Research Data Services
(WRDS), and specifically the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database, to
determine which alliances include both biotech firms and pharmaceutical firms that were
publicly traded at the end of the month of the event date. Because the initial data only
indicated the month on which the alliance was announced, I further refined the event date
(date of the alliance announcement) by performing a web search on each partner
combination in the stated month. This search produced specific alliance announcements,
which allowed me to define the exact date of the announcement. This date was then used
to construct the three day window to measure the dependent variable. This data set
includes 927 alliance events with exactly two partners that were both publicly traded at
the time of the event date. Data availability constraints limited the final sample use in
Model 2 of the analysis to 200 alliance events.
Measures
Dependent Variable
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Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR): The dependent variable is the sum of the
abnormal stock returns (CAR) of the biotech firm around the time of the alliance
announcement. CAR represents the deviation between the realized return, measured by
the biotech firm’s actual stock price movement, and the expected return of the biotech
firm’s stock performance. CAR has been used extensively as a performance measure in
joint venture event studies (Gulati, Lavie, & Singh, 2009; Koh & Venkatraman, 1991;
Park & Kim, 1997; Reuer & Koza, 2000) and as a dependent variable in alliance studies
(Anand & Khanna, 2000).
I calculated the expected return by using a benchmark portfolio comprised of sizeadjusted firms that match the 2-digit SIC code of the sample industry. I monitored the
return during a three-day window [-1, 0, 1] around the alliance announcement of both the
portfolio and the biotech firm (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997), and calculated the
cumulative difference over the three days as the difference between the two cumulative
returns. The short three-day window was chosen in an attempt to isolate the news of the
alliance announcement and help prevent the inclusion of non-alliance related news in the
movement of the securities [see for example Lee et al.(2000)], thus following the
argument of market efficiency. I then matched the calculated CAR values by firm ID and
date to the 927 alliance events in my sample.
Independent Variables
Technical Expertise: I measured the technical expertise held by the alliance partners
as a ratio, indicating the level of the commonly held knowledge of the alliance. While
prior studies have used R&D intensity as a measure of technological capabilities (Cohen
& Levinthal, 1989; Mowery et al., 1996), Mowery et al. (1998) pointed out that R&D
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intensity is an input measure while patents are an output measure that more accurately
reflect technology-based capabilities.
Following Mowery et al. (1996) and their use of a cross-citation rate of patents, I am
measuring the technological expertise of the alliance as:

(

𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑜𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠
)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑜𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠

where the common patent citations of both partners is the number of patents that both
partners cite in their own patents, and total citations of both partners is the sum of the
totals of both partners’ citations. The result is a ratio of patent citation overlap that is an
indicator of the technical expertise of the newly announced alliance.
The formula above should be interpreted as follows: a move toward a higher patent
citation overlap relative to the total number of patent citations of both partners, indicated
by an increase in the value of the ratio, suggests a greater technological overlap of the
alliance partners because a higher percentage of the total patents (knowledge) of both
partners cite the same previously patented technological expertise. The result is that an
increase in the value of the ratio is a shift toward an exploitative technical expertise of the
alliance since the alliance partners bring less patented knowledge into the alliance that is
new to the other partner.
The opposite, a decrease in the value of the ratio suggests a move toward a lower
patent citation overlap, indicating that the knowledge brought into the alliance by both
partners overlaps less. This in turn suggests that the technological expertise of each
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partner vis-à-vis the other is less redundant, and as a result the technical expertise of the
alliance is more explorative.
To summarize, an increasing value of shared technical expertise suggests a move
toward a more exploitative technical expertise, whereas a decreasing value suggests a
move toward a more explorative technical expertise of the alliance.
Relationship expertise: I measure the degree to which the alliance partners know
each other based on three firm indicators that the management literature suggests
determine the type of relationship between two alliance partners: 1) prior alliance partner
experience (Li et al., 2008; Sampson, 2005) , 2) recency of prior alliance experiences
(Villalonga & McGahan, 2005), and 3) prior experience in the specific type of alliance
(i.e. R&D, marketing, etc.) (Sampson, 2005).
In the following section I briefly outline each of these three indicators as well as how
I coded the Relationship Expertise variable used in the analysis.
Prior alliance-partner relationship: This variable indicates whether the two partner
firms have worked with each other in an alliance before, and if so, how often. The
argument for inclusion of this measure is that a stronger familiarity with the alliance
partner should increase the efficient transfer of knowledge (Cohen, 2009; Kogut &
Zander, 1992; Mowery et al., 1998) and thus lead to a higher probability of inventive
success.
I proxied the firm’s alliance level experience with the partner by the number of
previous collaborations, using the original dataset of 28,740 alliances. I calculated this
variable as the cumulative sum of all prior alliances with the same partner. The variable

23

is a discrete quantitative variable expressed as the number of previous collaborations, not
including the current alliance. The data revealed that the range in my sample is from 0 –
6.
An increase in this variable suggests that the partners have stronger familiarity with
each other, whereas a decrease in this variable would suggest that the partners have less
familiarity with each other. Consequently, an increase in this variable is a shift toward a
more exploitative relationship since partners most likely will use previously established
organizational relationships (Gulati et al., 2009), while a decrease in this variable is a
shift toward a more explorative relationship.
Recency of prior alliance experience with same partner: This variable indicates how
recent the partners’ last cooperation was and is expressed in days. It is meant to capture
the degree to which organizational structures may have changed since the last cooperative
relationship between the partners, where it is assumed that a more intimate knowledge of
the organizational structures of the alliance partner may lead to more efficiency.
This variable is expressed as a discrete quantitative variable in days since the last
relationship, using the original dataset of 28,740 alliances. Many partner combinations
have never worked with each other, which may be viewed as an extreme unfamiliarity
with the partner’s organization structures. I chose to assign an arbitrary value of 10,000
(days) to those alliances to reflect fact that the partners have no first-hand knowledge of
working with each other. I chose to take the inverse (1/X) of the number of days since the
last partnership. By doing so I transformed the variable into a smaller range (from 0 – 1),
and I coded the variable so that an increase in this variable suggests a more recent
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experience (which will be in line with all other indicator variables where an increase
suggests an exploitative relationship with the partner).
The result is a variable that indicates the recency of the previous experience with the
same partner, where an increase in the value of this variable suggests a more recent
experience and consequently a more exploitative relationship. Conversely, a decrease in
the value of this variable signals a shift toward a more unfamiliar relationship, which may
be considered explorative.
Alliance-type specific partner experience: This variable is an extension of the
previous two variables. It indicates whether the partner firms have worked together in the
specific type of the focal alliance before. I define the different types as, for example,
R&D alliances, marketing alliances, licensing alliance, supply alliance, etc.
I used the original dataset of 28,740 alliances and counted how often the two partners
in a focal alliance worked together in the specific type of alliance. This is a discrete
quantitative variable with a range from 0 – 5.
An increase in the value of this variable suggests a move toward a more exploitative
relationship because the relationship becomes both less new and less rare. A decrease in
this variable suggests a move towards a more explorative relationship because the type of
alliance relationship is new or rare.
The final Relationship Expertise variable, which I used in my regression analysis, is
the sum of the three relationship variables described above. I chose to use the sum
because I found no evidence in the literature that one indicator ought to be weighted more
heavily than another.
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Market expertise: I measured two indicators that together represent the market
expertise of the alliance: 1) the sum of the individual experience of the partners with the
FDA approval process, and 2) the sum of the individual success of the partners in moving
a product from one stage to the next (and subsequently closer to market approval).
FDA approval process experience: As mentioned earlier, the FDA approval process
consists of six distinct stages through which the firm needs to move the therapy through
before it can be marketed. FDA approval process experience can be gained on two
dimensions. First, experience over time in the same stage. If a firm has had prior
experience working with a therapy in, for example, the pre-clinical stage (stage 1), it
influences the firms action working with future therapies in stage 1 and should therefore
considered as expertise dealing with stage 1 of the FDA approval process.
Using the original data set with 28,740 alliances, I counted the number of times that
each partner in each alliance has had a therapy in one of the six stages in the past (based
on the alliance announcement date) and summed those up. As a result, each alliance
partner in each alliance has a sum of prior experiences in each of the six distinct stages of
the FDA approval process.
The second dimension is the experience across stages, and a decision as to how to
add up the numbers representing the prior experience within each of the six distinct FDA
stages had to be made. I tested for correlation between the six cumulative variables
(stages) for each firm at each date, and found a high degree of correlation. In fact, all
bivariate correlations were statistically significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test).
Because the literature dealing with FDA approval stages does not indicate if one stage
should receive a greater weight when creating an index, and because of the correlations I
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found, I followed Grice (2001), who suggested using the factor scoring coefficients of a
principle components analysis (PCA) as weights when creating an index. I performed a
PCA to compute the factor scoring coefficients and used those as weights in computing
the Market Expertise variable for each firm at each alliance date. Specifically, the
weights are:
= (S1 x 0.188) + (S2 x 0.132) + (S3 x 0.192) + (S4 x 0.202) x (S5 x 0.188) + (S6 x 0.196)
where S stands for the stage in the approval process. The result is one indicator of prior
FDA approval experience for each firm. I then added up the values of the two partners,
resulting in an indicator of prior FDA approval experience for the alliance. An increase in
this indicator suggests more experience, making the experience exploitative, whereas a
decrease in this indicator suggests a movement toward a newer experience, making the
experience explorative.
FDA approval process success: This second indicator of market expertise
indicates whether the alliance partners have previously had any success moving a therapy
from one stage of the approval process to the next. Given the very small percentage of
therapies that actually gain final FDA approval, and the large percentage of therapies that
never moved beyond the initial stage, I coded any movement from one stage to the next
as success, using the original data set of 28,740 alliances. Because success is rare, I
assumed that when it happens, it significantly influences the firms’ market experience. As
a result, I did not restrict when in the past the success occurred. Next, I summed up all
successful movements of the alliance partners in prior alliances.
The resulting indicator may be interpreted as follows: an increase in the success value
suggests more previous success, which may be interpreted as exploitative (because
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having success is then not as new to the firms). A decrease in the value of this variable
suggests that success is a more a newer experience for the firms, which may be
interpreted as a more explorative.
The variable used in the analysis, Market Expertise, is the product of FDA approval
process experience and FDA approval process success. Given the amount of resources it
takes to succeed in the FDA approval process, I chose to multiply the variables so as to
assign a greater value to an alliance with partners that have experience and success.
Additionally, by multiplying these two variables I recognize the rarity of success. This
approach puts a greater quantitative distance between those who are not at all, marginally
or very successful.
Control Variables
Firm size: I control for firm size because prior research suggests that firm size may
explain R&D expenditures and firm performance (Levitas & McFadyen, 2009). R&D
expenditures are especially relevant in this study because of this potential correlation with
exploration and exploitation, and firm performance may be correlated to CAR. I used the
natural log of the R&D firms’ total assets as of December 31st of the year prior to the
alliance date, which captures both tangible and intangible assets. Biotechnology firms
often do not carry significant tangible assets but rather intangible assets (Rothaermel &
Deeds, 2006), and patents are a form of intangible assets.
Industry environment: I created an industry index based on the Lerner Index (Lerner,
1994) as an indicator of the industry's willingness and ability to fund R&D projects in the
biotech industry (Levitas & McFadyen, 2009). Willingness and ability to fund R&D
projects greatly depend on the macroeconomic environment and industry outlook. There
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is less funding available during economic downturns as companies and investors retract
from engaging in risky endeavors, such as R&D. This retraction would then be
measurable in this index; hence this measure is an appropriate proxy for the
macroeconomic environment for the purpose of this study.
I calculated the index by using the month-end share price of common stock of a
random sample of 12 biopharmaceutical companies from January 31st, 1989 to December
31st, 2008 and set January 31st 1989 to 1.000, resulting in a total of 240 industry values. I
then matched those to the alliance date by using the industry index from the month
ending prior to the alliance date.
Firm Age: To control for firm age is appropriate because the older the firm, the
higher the probability that it had partnered with others in the past or had engaged in the
patenting and FDA approval process. Therefore age influences many of the independent
variables described above. Firm age is measured in years since the firm’s founding
(Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006), and I included the age of other partners in the analysis.
Number of current, active alliances: I used the original data set of 28,470 alliances
and counted the total number of alliances for the Client firm in the two partner alliances.
Because termination dates of alliances are usually not available, I only considered
alliances that were three years or younger at the time of the event as active.
Model and Estimation
I tested the three sets of hypotheses using a linear mixed regression analysis that
examines the effect of (1) the technical expertise of the alliance, (2) the relationship
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expertise of the alliance, and (3) the marketing expertise of the alliance on the cumulative
abnormal return (CAR) of the R&D partner in a two-firm alliance.
In addition to the three independent variables, I included a size variable, an industry
index indicating the funding availability within the focal industry at the time of the
alliance, an age variable, as well as a measure indicating the number of active alliances of
the partner firms as control variables in the regression analysis.
In the sample of 927 alliances, 382 firms account for the (2 x 927 =) 1,854 partners
involved in the alliances. 155 firms appear only once in the sample while one firm
appears 53 times. Because of the unbalanced nature of the sample, as well as the likely
presence of between-subject (firm) specific effects, a standard estimation method would
not be appropriate.
To adjust for the characteristics of the sample, I used a linear mixed model design to
execute the regression analysis that allows the subjects (firms) to differ from one another
(Maxwell & Delaney, 2004). This approach allowed me to introduce random effects for
each of the partner firms. Table 3 shows the fixed effects data estimation (within subject
estimation) while accounting for the between-subjects firm effects. Parameters were
estimated by the method of maximum likelihood using Proc Mixed in SAS 9.3.
RESULTS
I first tested for the presence of cumulative abnormal returns by testing whether the
mean of the dependent variable is statistically different from 0. A T-Test confirmed that
CAR is statistically significant different from 0 at ∝ = 0.05 (one-sample t(456) = 5.155,

p < 0.0001) with a mean difference from 0 of 0.055, confirming previous studies (Dyer et
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al., 2001; Shah & Swaminathan, 2008) that the stock market reacts positively to alliance
announcements.
A close examination of CAR showed that the dependent variable and its residuals, are
not normally distributed. As a result, I transformed the variable using a natural log (ln)
transformation. I confirmed the successful transformation by visually inspecting the Q-Q
plot as well as the P-P plot and deemed the dependent variable as well as the residuals
approximately normal.
To assess the threat of collinearity I estimated the variance inflation factors (VIF) and
found none to be great than 1.8. Prior studies cite different cutoff values, and I went with
a conservative cutoff value of 10 (H. Y. Lee, 2011). As a result I conclude that no linear
dependency among the independent variables exists.
Definitions of variables and the full model specifications are shown in Table 1.
Descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix used in this study are provided in Table 2.
The results of the linear mixed regression analysis are reported in Table 3, where Model 1
serves as the base model, including only the control variables, while Model 2 includes
technical expertise, relationship expertise, and market expertise.
A likelihood ratio test, comparing model 1 to model 2, produced a chi-square statistic
(χ2 = 113.2, 3 d.f.) above the critical value of 7.815. The resulting log likelihood ratio
suggests that the addition of the three independent variables in Model 2 significantly
improves the model fit.
Hypotheses 1A and 1B suggest that investors will react to an alliance’s signal of
technical expertise. I found no evidence of a statistically significant relationship between
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the technical expertise of the alliance partners and CAR. As a result, I reject both
hypotheses 1A and 1B.
Hypotheses 2A and 2B suggest that investors will react to the alliance’s signal of
relationship expertise. Specifically, hypothesis 2A suggests that investors react positively
to the combined explorative relationship expertise of the alliance partners. The results
provide statistical support for this hypothesis. The negative regression coefficient (-.000)
indicates that as relationship expertise decreases (a shift towards exploration), investors’
perception of value (proxied by CAR) increases (p<0.001). As a result of hypothesis 2A
being supported, I reject hypothesis 2B, which suggested that investors react positively to
exploitative relationship expertise (which would have been evidenced by a positive
regression coefficient).
Hypotheses 3A and 3B suggest that investors will react to the alliance’s signal of
market expertise. Specifically, hypothesis 3A suggests that there is a positive relationship
between the combined explorative market expertise of the alliance partners and the
investors’ perception of value. For this to be the case, I would expect a statistically
significant p-value with a negative regression coefficient, which is not the case (the
regression coefficient is positive). As a result, I reject Hypothesis 3A.
Hypothesis 3B proposes that the combined exploitative relationship expertise of the
alliance partners would positively affect the investors’ perception of value. I did find
statistically significant evidence to support hypothesis 3B. The correlation coefficient is
positive (.000), indicating exploitation, and the p-value of 0.059 indicates marginal
statistical significance at the 0.1 level.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study examined the causes of investors’ reaction to alliance announcements. The
underlying assumption of this study is that alliance announcements lead to an increase in
stock market valuation of the participating firms, which then allowed me to investigate
possible determinants. With a focus on the R&D partner, I confirmed that the sample in
this study showed this characteristic, which allowed me to proceed and test three
independent variables and their effect (signal) on the investors’ perception of value.
The empirical portion of this study tested three sets of competing hypothesis that the
management literature has not previously addressed. Interestingly, this study found no
support for the first set of hypotheses that the technical expertise of alliance partners
carries decodable signals to investors, as evidenced by the lack of statistically significant
regression results (hypotheses 1A and 1B). Technical expertise in particular, which
speaks to the ability of the alliance to create measurable results (in the form of patents)
that could impact the future returns of the firm, should send rich signals to the investors.
Especially in an environment of information asymmetry, I suggested that investors are
eager to receive and decode signals that may allow them to more accurately predict the
probability of future success of the alliance.
There may be several reasons for the lack of statistically significant findings, and, as
such, implications for future research. First, given how potentially noisy this particular
signal may be (given the vast number of patent citations that need to be coded to
specifically match both firms), investors may simply not have enough time or the ability
to decode this variable and then react in a timely manner to the alliance announcement. A
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future study may consider isolating this variable and introducing a moderator so as to test
whether this lack of statistically significant findings holds under different conditions.
Second, given the large number of alliance failures, investors may consciously choose not
to consider this particular signal of technical expertise. Their internal evaluation model
may have discredited this signal as unreliable as a predictor of future success.
The second set of hypotheses found that investors prefer alliance partner
combinations with less previous work experience with each other (exploration) over
alliances in which the partners have had a higher number of previous collaborations with
each other (exploitation). These findings seem to contradict prior studies which suggest
that efficient knowledge transfer (Cohen, 2009; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Mowery et al.,
1998), knowledge of organizational routines (Beckman et al., 2004; Parkhe, 1993), and
trust between partners (Li et al., 2008) are important indicators of organizational
efficiencies, and thus may lead to a higher probability of success. Investors appear to
value the possibility and benefit of reduced inertia between partners more highly than any
other efficiencies that multiple collaborations would result in, as previous studies have
suggested (Sx & Rowley, 2002).
In fact, the findings may suggest several things. First, could it be possible that
investors believe that efficient knowledge transfer, knowledge of organizational routines,
and trust between partners may not be positively related to the number of collaborations.
Second, the findings suggest that investors like to take risk because an explorative
relationship is by definition more risky than an exploitative relationship. One avenue for
a future study would be to focus on the risk averseness of investors and introduce this
concept into a follow-up study. Third, because exploration suggests a divergence from
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previous activities, and because of the high failure rates of alliances, investors may
interpret this signal as a firm-level reassessment of previous performance, and thus as a
sign that firms are trying to correct previous strategic decisions that may have led to
failures. This, then, would be in line with previous studies that suggest that firms get
better by learning from previous experiences (Sampson, 2005), which in this case could
mean to not work with the same partner again but rather focus on explorative (new)
relationships.
The last set of findings pertaining to hypotheses 3A and 3B informs us about the
investors’ preference regarding the combined FDA-specific approval process experience
and success. The analysis found that investors prefer alliances with more FDA approval
process experience and success (exploitation) over alliances with less experience and
success (exploration). These findings support prior studies that linked experience and
learning to superior performances (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Given the high number of
alliance failures, these findings support the notion that investors would value the processspecific experience and prior success of alliance partners.
Despite its contributions, this study is not without limitations. For example, the threeday window around the alliance announcement might not be enough time for investors to
consider the patenting activity of each partner and the resulting combined technical
expertise. A bigger window might possibly lead to different findings. However, a bigger
window would also increase the possibility of non-alliance related events influencing the
stock price of the focal firm (such as, for example, a dividend announcement, or a change
in the top management team of the focal firm).
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In conclusion, this study contributes to the field’s understanding of determinants of
investors’ perception of value of alliance formations. The emphasis on technical
expertise, relationship expertise, and marketing expertise, where each variable is coded
along a continuum from exploration to exploitation, is a unique perspective that in this
form has not been explored in the management literature.
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Table 1: Definition of variables and model specifications
Variable Name

Definition

CAR (R&D)

The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of the R&D partner, calculated
using a portfolio of firms with the same 2-digit SIC code, adjusted for
size and transformed (natural log) to adjust for non-normality of the data
and the residuals.
An indicator of the technical expertise of the two partner firms in the
focal alliance based on patent citation overlap. A low value indicates
exploration, a high value indicates exploitation.
An index describing the level of relationship experience between the two
partners, calculated as = (Frequency) + (Recency) + (ATSPE); a low
value indicates exploration, a high value indicates exploitation.
The number or frequency of prior alliance relationships between the two
firms
The recency (in days) of the last alliance relationship between the two. If
the two partners have not worked before I set the value to 10,000
The alliance type specific partner experience, indicating if these two
firms have worked together in this type of alliance before.
An index describing the FDA approval process experience of the alliance
partners at the time of the alliance date, calculated as ((C-MKT-Index +
RD-MKT-Index) x (Alliance Success)). A low value indicates
exploration, a high value indicates exploitation.
The cumulative FDA approval process experience of the Client firm in
each stage of the process and across all stages at the time of the alliance.
The cumulative FDA approval process experience of the R&D firm in
each stage of the process and across all stages at the time of the alliance.
The cumulative FDA approval success of the two partners.
Control variable, the natural log of total assets of the R&D firm
Control variable, an industry index proxying the funding availability in
the focal industry.
Control variable, the age of the client firm from the firm’s founding to
the alliance date.
Control variable, the age of the R&D firm from the firm’s founding to
the alliance date
Control variable, the number of current active alliances of the client firm
as of the event date.

Technical Expertise

Relationship
Expertise
Frequency
Recency
ATSPE
Market Expertise

C-MKT-Index
RD-MKT-Index
Alliance Success
Size (R&D)
Industry Environment
Age (Client)
Age (R&D)
Active Alliances
(Client)

Hypothesis

Model Specification(s)

H1, H2, H3

CAR = (Technical Expertise) + (Relationship Expertise) + (Market Expertise)
+ (R&D Size) + (Industry Environment) + (Client Age) + (R&D Age) + (Client
Active Alliances)

Table 2: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations
Mean
1

CAR

2

Technical Expertise

3

Relationship Expertise

S.D.

1

-.68

.29

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1

.42

.49

.080

1

-8704.14

3219.58

-.270**

-.064

1

509.82

1133.40

*

.068

-.038

1

4.65

1.87

.018

.040

.027

-.037

1

4

Marketing Expertise

5

Size (R&D)

6

Industry Index

1.46

.31

.013

.042

.044

.007

.021

1

7

Age (Client)

88.04

226.44

.000

-.008

-.042

-.036

.001

-.065*

1

8

Age (R&D)

20.05

94.44

.004

.056

-.006

-.020

-.013

.015

-.002

1

-.007

**

-.053

.006

-.020

9

Active Alliances (Client)

28.45

28.29

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

.120

-.016

.049

-.022

.214

1
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Table 3: Maximum Likelihood estimates on CAR of Technical Expertise,
Relationship Expertise and Market Expertise
Model 1
CAR

Explanatory Variable
Intercept

-0.674 (0.080)***

Technical Expertise
Relationship Expertise
Marketing Expertise
Size (R&D)
Industry Index
Age (Client)
Age (R&D)
Active Alliances (Client)

Log-likelihood ratio
Log-likelihood ratio vs. Model 1
Number of events

0.005
0.001
-0.000
-0.001
-0.000
87.5
347

Standard errors appear in parentheses
†p<0.10; *p>0.05; **p>0.01; ***p>0.001

(0.007)
(0.047)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)

Model 2
CAR
-0.966
0.015
-0.000
0.000
0.007
0.077
-0.000
-0.001
-0.000

(0.103)***
(0.033)
(0.000)***
(0.000)†
(0.008)
(0.054)
(0.000)
(0.000)*
(0.000)

-25.7
113.2 ***
200
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INTRODUCTION
Alliances have held a prominent place in the management literature, and their
importance has been widely acknowledged (Kale & Singh, 2009). A significant amount
of research has focused on reasons for alliance formations, which include, among others,
access to new capabilities (Oxley & Sampson, 2004; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008),
access to new markets (Chen & Chen, 2002; Koka & Prescott, 2008), access to new
assets (Huggins, 2010; Li, Eden, Hitt, & Ireland, 2008) including new knowledge
(Walter, Lechner, & Kellermanns, 2007), and enhanced reputation (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas,
Arregle, & Borza, 2000). Additionally, studies have found that alliances can lead to more
efficient facilitation of information transmittal between firms (Davis & Greve, 1997;
Haunschild, 1993), or reduction in various forms of uncertainty (Beckman, Haunschild,
& Phillips, 2004; Goerzen, 2007; Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad, 1989; Varadarajan &
Cunningham, 1995). It is this last reason for, or benefit of, alliance formations, the
potential for a reduction in uncertainty, that is the focus of this study.
Certain types of uncertainty create an environmental condition that has the potential
to wreak havoc on the firm, which is why firms desire to proactively address and
subsequently attempt to reduce uncertainty whenever possible. Uncertainty can loosely
be described as being in a state of doubt, depending on chance, and being unsure of the
future. What makes the concept of uncertainty difficult to address strategically is the fact
that there are different types of uncertainty (e.g. market or systemic uncertainty, firm
specific or unsystematic uncertainty) and that uncertainty can be experienced or
perceived on several different levels (e.g., internal vs. external to the organization).
Because of its complexity, uncertainty can negatively impact organizations’ planning and
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decision making processes (Jauch & Kraft, 1986; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), leading to a
firm’s attempt to avoid or reduce uncertainty. Forming an alliance is one way to
proactively address uncertainty, rooted in the understanding that some levels of
uncertainty can be managed by adapting the organizational design that best fits the
environment (Williamson, 1981).
Alliances enable firms to deal with uncertainty better than a single firm because of the
many synergistic effects alliances offer (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1991).
However, given the various types of uncertainty, I suggest that simply forming an
alliance is not adequate to address uncertainty. Special attention should also be devoted to
selecting a partner with the right skills. Previous studies have found that the degree to
which alliance partners’ specific skills and resources are similar or complementary
matters (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 2001), and that firms search for alliance
partners with this dimension in mind (Doh, 2000; Stuart, 2000). Similarity can reduce
friction and can lead to efficiencies. On the other hand, a degree of complementarity (or
diversity) may be necessary to meet unforeseen challenges imposed by uncertainty.
Whether similar or complementary partners lead to a reduction of uncertainty is an
interesting question, one that I will investigate further in this study. I examine how
similarity or complementarity between partners interacts with current environmental
conditions, how subsequently investors interpret the partner skill combinations and how
this interpretation will affect uncertainty as perceived by investors.
In this study, I specifically examine how uncertainty as perceived by investors is
affected by measuring components forming the explore/exploit dichotomy. Explorative
and exploitative skills and expertise send very rich signals to investors, meaning that
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these signals carry a lot of information which investors decode and react to. Exploration
and exploitation are dimensions that, due to their ability to affect the trajectory of a firm,
provide an effective base on which to assess investor reactions. I examine partner firms in
order to observe partner combinations that can be considered as either similar or
complementary. Firms are said to need distinctly different organization forms to
successfully explore or exploit, making this dimension an ideal variable to distinguish
between two partner firms.
Further defining my research setting, I am focusing on two-firm alliances in the
pharmaceutical industry between a biotech firm and a pharmaceutical company. I will
specifically focus on how exogenous uncertainty moderates the relationship between the
alliance partners and endogenous uncertainty experienced by the biotech firm. My
research question is as follows: Given different levels of exogenous (industry)
uncertainty (high, low), should partner-specific skills within an alliance be similar or
complementary so as to send the desired signal to investors and, as a result, reduce the
uncertainty of the biotech firm as perceived by investors?
I will draw on signaling theory (Spence, 1973; Spence, 1974) to derive six total (four
specific) hypotheses and suggest that strong signals that communicate the alliance’s
abilities to deal with different environmental conditions (e.g. different levels of
exogenous uncertainty), based on the very specific combination of skills of the alliance
partners, will lead to a positive (and desirable) reduction in firm-specific uncertainty as
perceived by investors. I am extending the literature by focusing on the partner-skill
combination of alliances in different environments defined by the level of exogenous
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uncertainty. Empirical analysis using a sample of pharmaceutical alliances will test my
hypotheses.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
The construct of uncertainty has been the subject of strong interest in prior
management science studies, especially as it impacts strategic directions of the firm
(Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009; Bourgeois III, 1985; Desarbo, Di Benedetto, Song, &
Sinha, 2005; Jauch & Kraft, 1986; Mascarenhas, 2011) . The general consensus is that,
while some uncertainty is unavoidable (systemic), a reduction in unsystematic (firmspecific) uncertainty is possible and desirable but requires very specific, strategic action
(Galbraith, 1973). Because of the negative impact internal and external uncertainty may
have on firms, managers are encouraged to actively try to reduce uncertainty whenever
and wherever possible (Daft & Lengel, 1986). One available strategic response to
uncertainty is to make changes to structural arrangements as they pertain to
organizational design (Williamson, 1981), one of which is to enter a strategic alliance
(Goerzen, 2007).
Part of the process of forming an alliance is partner selection. I will explain later how
I define effective alliance partner selection within the context of my research question,
but would like to point out that the focus of this study is not on the process of selecting
alliance partners. Instead I focus on how the combination of partners selected sends a
signal to investors. The type of partner selected (in terms of explorative/exploitative
skills) matters to the alliance, and as a result, matters to investors. Effective partners for
the purpose of this study are those that create a partner-skill combination that lowers
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firm-specific uncertainty as perceived by investors, given the level of exogenous
uncertainty experienced by the alliance.
The next section will outline the two different types of uncertainty I consider in this
study: firm specific uncertainty, which will directly influence uncertainty as perceived by
investors (the outcome variable), and exogenous uncertainty experienced by the industry
(the moderator).
Firm-Specific Uncertainty
As Beckman et al. (2004) pointed out, firm-specific uncertainties arise when firms
experience some internal turbulence, such as entering a new market (Greve, 1996),
purchasing another firm (Haunschild, 1994), experiencing high internal turnover (Carroll,
1984), experiencing information asymmetry between managers and shareholders, or
doubting technical success (McGrath, 1997). I proxy firm-specific uncertainty by
measuring the focal firm’s stock price volatility, thereby conceptually following Lang
and Lockhard (1990), who suggested that a firm’s internal perception of uncertainty is
positively related to financial volatility.
Examples of specific action to reduce firm-specific uncertainty can be found in the
pharmaceutical industry. Firms may experience uncertainty when, for example, they
know that a competitor is working toward a similar therapy (e.g. a cure for an illness).
Increased investment by entering an alliance, which will provide access to new resources
with the goal of eventually filing for patent protection before the competitor can do it,
may be considered a strategic action taken to reduce firm-specific uncertainty. Therefore,
firms in the pharmaceutical industries may deal with firm-specific uncertainty by entering
into alliances, which is in line with McGrath’s (1997) assessment of firm responses to
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internal uncertainty as well as with Pindyck’s (1993) suggestion that ‘taking action’
(entering an alliance, subsequently being able to focus on needed R&D, and filing for
patent protection) can reduce internal uncertainty and lead to a higher probability of
success.
In addition, firm-specific uncertainty in the pharmaceutical industry arises largely out
of the complex and resource-consuming approval process set up and monitored by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Getting a new therapy approved may take upward
of 15 years and costs, on average, over $800 million (Pennings & Sereno, 2011). The
process itself consist of six distinct approval stages, starting at the pre-clinical stage,
Investigative New Drug (IND) application, three phases including testing on humans, and
eventually the approval and market stage. Before a therapy moves from one stage to the
next, it has to prove its effectiveness (as defined by each stage). These FDA hurdles are
designed to prove effectiveness, and because success is not certain, they create
uncertainty, which I suggest will be observed through the stock price volatility of the
partner firms.
Because of the plethora of distinct skills and expertise, as well as other resources
needed to move from one FDA approval stage to the next, a preferred organizational
form to address the uncertainty that accompanies engagement in the approval process is
the alliance. Entering into an alliance enables the partner firms to gain access to
additional resources, which may reduce firm-specific uncertainty. The alliance
announcement, therefore, might serve as a signal to the investors that firms are actively
addressing internal uncertainty.
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Next, I evaluate how the choice of combined skills and expertise of the partners
affects investors’ perception of uncertainty, followed by a test of how exogenous
uncertainty moderates this relationship.
Skill combination of partners
It is understood that the search for an alliance partner has to go beyond simply
choosing from the partner with the most resources, but rather involved choose a partner
whose resources effectively complement or supplement those of the focal firm. Gaining
access to the right resources, given the specific internal and external alliance
environment, is a crucial managerial task (Shah & Swaminathan, 2008). The choice of
partners, I assume, is a conscious strategic decision by the firm. This means that,
assuming that each firm has options, the partner chosen may represent the partner that has
the skills managers believe most efficiently offset any weaknesses of the other partner.
In this study, I frame the choice of partners along an exploration/exploitation
dimension with regard to technical expertise. Exploration is defined as searching, risk
taking, discovery, innovation, and experimentation (March, 1991). Exploration has also
been associated with concepts like investment, building new capabilities, and entering
new lines of business (Koza & Lewin, 1999), and some would define it simply as the
pursuit of new knowledge (Rothaermel, 2001). Because pursuit of the unknown by
definition creates uncertainty about which exact skills are needed to succeed, firms may
decide on a strategy focused around economies of scope.
Exploitation, on the other hand, more commonly refers to refinement, efficiency,
production, selection, and implementation (March, 1991). Here firms are said to focus
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more on economies of scale, using existing processes and knowledge to refine a product
or process, but certainly do not consistently explore the unknown.
The decision to characterize partner skills based on exploration and exploitation is
based on the literature’s acknowledgement that every individual firm, as well as the
alliance in an aggregate, focuses to a degree on either or both of these activities (March,
1991). Therefore, exploration and exploitation play a part in a firm’s overall strategic
direction, and evidence of either should be found in any firm. Next, I will address these
definitions as well as a justification for why I chose to express partner skills in those
terms.
A basic premise of this study is that explorative skills will equip an organization to
deal with environmental conditions that call for explorative responses, while exploitative
skills prepare organizations to deal with exploitative environmental conditions. Because
explorative and exploitative skills signal fundamentally different partner abilities, and
because investors might be under-informed about with what the firms and the alliance
will actually do, investors will rely on very basic properties of these signals.
The dimensions of exploration and exploitation are well suited for this study because
they signal fundamentally different strategic directions and possible future trajectories of
the firm. This study centers on the question of what partner-skill similarity or
complementary signals to investors, and how this signal affects uncertainty as perceived
by investors. I will explore the concepts of skill similarity and skill complementarity in
the next section.
Effective partner selection, i.e., creating a partner combination that reduces
uncertainty as perceived by investors, is a critical step in leading an alliance onto a path
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toward perceived value creation. Previous studies have addressed the issue of partner
skills and resource complementarity (Harrison et al., 2001; Ohmae, 1989). The concept
of complementary skills specifically refers to different skills that the partners bring into
the alliance, with the assumption that different skills, such as abilities, knowledge,
organizational design, and experience, etc., are then used strategically to offset possible
weaknesses of the other partner. Skill similarity suggests that partners have similar types
of skills (e.g., both have experience in the same type of therapeutic classes, both have
guided a therapy through the FDA approval process, both have the ability to innovate).
Harrison et al. (2001) studied the question of resource similarity vs. complementarity
and thus started this important conversation. Previous studies addressing skill similarity
vs. complementarity have centered on the relatedness/performance hypothesis. Earlier
research mostly suggested that relatedness should lead to higher performance (Singh &
Montgomery, 1987). However, other studies found contradictory evidence and thus
opened the door for additional research [see Harrison et al. (1991) for a review]. In the
context of this study, higher performance should be achieved by creating lower internal
uncertainty as perceived by investors. As a result I test the findings of previous studies by
re-phrasing those terms of lower firm-specific uncertainty.

Hypothesis 1: High levels of skill complementary between alliance partners results in
low firm-specific uncertainty of the biotech firm as perceived by investors.

Hypothesis 2: High levels of skill similarity between alliance partners results in low
firm-specific uncertainty of the biotech firm as perceived by investors.
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Exogenous Uncertainty
While firm-specific uncertainty is specific to the firm, exogenous uncertainty is the
kind that every firm within an industry or group experiences. Because it is, to a degree,
systemic to the industry or group, this type of uncertainty cannot be controlled at the firm
level. Exogenous uncertainty is an independent construct from firm-specific uncertainty
because it is possible for a firm to experience very low internal uncertainty while the
industry to which the firm belongs may experience high uncertainty, or vice versa. For
example, an industry might experience overall demand uncertainty, but the individual
firm-specific demand might be stable. As a result, I will designate the industry
environment as one of high exogenous uncertainty or low exogenous uncertainty at the
time of the alliance announcement and measure how exogenous uncertainty moderates
the relationship between the choice of alliance partners and firm-specific uncertainty of
the biotech firm as perceived by investors. The next two hypotheses in this study are
designed to test investors’ perception of uncertainty under high exogenous uncertainty.
I suggest that high exogenous uncertainty calls for strategic approaches that broaden
the resource level within the alliance. Because high exogenous uncertainty present at the
industry level suggests that an alliance has to address a greater diversity of issues than an
alliance operating under low exogenous uncertainty, resource complementarity could lead
to the desired economies of scope (Harrison et al., 2001). By selecting a partner with
complementary skills, the alliance partner firms would create some flexibility and put
themselves in a position to be able to address a more diverse range of issues. This could
lead to a subsequent reduction in uncertainty of the biotech partner as perceived by
investors.
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Choosing a partner with similar skills, however, equates to introducing more of the
same resources and skills into the alliance. This would not be as desirable a strategy in an
environment of high exogenous uncertainty because the alliance runs the risk of having
excess unusable resources, while not possessing other, requites resources. The alliance is
unable to use its existing resources to address and cope with exogenous uncertainty; more
of the same would not be viewed as beneficial by investors. As a result I suggest two
hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3: The level of exogenous uncertainty moderates the relationship between
skill sets of alliances partners and firm-specific uncertainty of the biotech firm as
perceived by investors such that under high levels of exogenous uncertainty, skill
complementarity of the alliance partners results in low firm-specific uncertainty of
the biotech firm as perceived by investors.

Hypothesis 4: The level of exogenous uncertainty moderates the relationship between
skill sets of alliances partners and firm-specific uncertainty of the biotech firm as
perceived by investors such that under high levels of exogenous uncertainty, skill
similarity of the alliance partners results in low firm-specific uncertainty of the
biotech firm as perceived by investors.

Hypotheses 4 and 5 will test the investors’ perception of uncertainty (of the biotech
firm) under low exogenous uncertainty. Low exogenous uncertainty suggests that the
industry in which the alliance operates in does not experience a lot of turbulences but
operates in a rather stable environment. This would suggest that firms have figured out
what kinds of resources are needed to survive.
I suggest that under low levels of exogenous uncertainty, investors will react
positively to alliances that appear to be aware of the general lack of this type of
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uncertainty and thus focus on efficiencies as well as economies of scale. Given the nature
of a stable industry environment with low uncertainty, firms have the luxury to carefully
select a partner that will enhance their own capabilities by adding to those (e.g. more of
the same). In the absence of high exogenous uncertainty, alliances can now afford to
focus all of their efforts (meaning: all of the combined skills and expertises) on one goal:
to either explore or to exploit. Therefore, alliances signal to investors that they are aware
of the lack of exogenous uncertainty and that they are willing and ready to capitalize on
this knowledge. Because of the lack of exogenous uncertainty companies do not have to
take efficiency risks.
If, in this state of low exogenous uncertainty, alliances would comprise of firms with
complementary skills, investors may critically question that partner combination because
it may not lead to the desired maximum performance. The partner selection could signal
that the partners are either not aware of the lack of exogenous uncertainty, or that no
other partner was available or willing to enter into a partnership. Neither signal would be
well received by investors because they signal some lack of external awareness. Low
exogenous uncertainty would call for strategies that aim to capitalize on the opportunities
for economies of scale. Investors observe this, and as a result I suggest that:

Hypothesis 5: The level of exogenous uncertainty moderates the relationship between
skill sets of alliances partners and firm-specific uncertainty of the biotech firm as
perceived by investors such that under low levels of exogenous uncertainty, skill
complementarity of the alliance partners result in low firm-specific uncertainty of the
biotech firm as perceived by investors.
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Hypothesis 6: The level of exogenous uncertainty moderates the relationship between
skill sets of alliances partners and firm-specific uncertainty of the biotech firm as
perceived by investors such that under low levels of exogenous uncertainty, skill
similarity of the alliance partners result in low firm-specific uncertainty of the biotech
firm as perceived by investors.

METHODS
Sample
I used a sample of bilateral alliances that include biotech firms and pharmaceutical
companies. I coded firms as Client or R&D to indicate the relationship where, generally,
the pharmaceutical company represents the Client firm and the biotech firm represents
the R&D partner. I chose this industry because alliances are a very common
organizational from, where partners are likely to work with each other numerous times.
In addition, this industry relies heavily on patent protection for its products which, as I
outlined before, sends very rich signals about the technical expertise of the alliance
partners.
All patent information was obtained from the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) Patent Citations database (Hall, Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & Centre for Economic
Policy Research (Great Britain), 2001), and the United States Patent and Trademark
Office’s (USPTO) Cassis database. Additional data were taken from Compustat data
files, the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) U.S. stock database, the
Recombinant Capital Biotechnology Database (ReCap), the IMS R&D Focus database,
Spectrum Institutional Ownership files, and United States Securities and Exchange (SEC)
proxy (DEF 14a) filings.
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The initial sample included 28,470 biopharmaceutical alliances established between
January 1st, 1989 and December 31st, 2008. I used the Wharton Research Data Services
(WRDS), and specifically the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database, to
determine which alliances included both biotech firms and pharmaceutical firms that
were publicly traded at the end of the month of the event date. Next, I further refined the
event date (date of the alliance announcement) by performing a web search on each
partner combination in the stated month; this search produced specific alliance
announcements which allowed me to define the exact date of the announcement. This
final data set includes 927 alliance events with exactly two partners that were both
publicly traded as of the event date.
Measures
Dependent Variable
Firm-Specific Uncertainty: I used the volatility of the focal R&D firm’s stock price as
a proxy for firm-specific uncertainty (Beckman et al., 2004). The management literature
cites a high correlation between the managerial perception of (firm-specific) uncertainty
and the volatility of the firm’s stock prices (Bourgeois III, 1985; Lang & Lockhart,
1990), which justifies the use of stock prices to proxy firm-specific uncertainty.
Specifically, following Beckman et al. (2004) I operationalize an individual firm’s
level of internal uncertainty as the coefficient of variation for firm j’s annual stock
closing price, or

𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚′ 𝑠𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒, 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑖, 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑗)
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚′ 𝑠 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒, 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑖, 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑗)
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where i = 1988, …, 2007, and the index j represents each firm in the sample.
By dividing the standard deviation by the mean, effectively calculating the coefficient
of variation, measurements of uncertainty can be interpreted across firms with different
price ranges (Beckman et al., 2004). I then matched this measure of R&D firm specific
uncertainty to each alliance based on firm ID and alliance date, where I used the firmspecific uncertainty from the year prior to the alliance announcement.
Independent Variables
Partner Similarity (Technical Expertise): I measure technical similarity using patent
citation counts of each partner. While prior studies have used R&D intensity as a measure
of technological capabilities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989; Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman,
1996), Mowery et al. (1998) pointed out that R&D intensity is an input measure while
patents are an output measure that more accurately reflects technology-based capabilities.
I conceptually follow previous studies (Mowery et al., 1998; Rothaermel & Boeker,
2008; Vassolo, Anand, & Folta, 2004) that measured the degree of
similarity/complementarity, between two firms by calculating dyadic patent or patent
citation ratios for each partner combination and measuring the distance between the ratios
as indicators of the degree of difference between partners. Specifically, I calculate the
technological distance between alliance partners by taking the absolute distance between
patent citation ratios of each firm (Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008), or
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𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 (𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡)

𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡

)-(
(𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡+𝑅&𝐷)

𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 (𝑅&𝐷)

Patent Citation Count (Client+R&D)

)|

Each ratio represents the percentage of total technical expertise brought into the
alliance by each partner. The absolute difference between the two ratios represents the
difference in technical expertise brought into the alliance by each partner and thus
represents a measure of technological similarity/complementarity within this dyadic
relationship. A smaller distance would suggest that each partner contributed a more equal
portion to the total technical expertise of the alliance (which suggests a higher degree of
technical similarity of the alliance partners), whereas a greater distance suggests that the
partners contributed a more unequal portion of the total technical expertise of the alliance
(which suggests a higher degree of technical complementarity of the alliance partners).
I then transformed the difference value by taking (1 – value). As a result, an increase
in this variable represents a move toward less distance between the partners, which may
be interpreted as an exploitative partner combination. A decrease in this variable
represents a trend toward greater distance between these variables, which would suggest
an explorative relationship. I decided on this transformation to ensure a level of
conformity to my related studies in which an increase in this value suggests a move
towards exploitation, and a decrease suggests a move toward exploration.
Exogenous (Industry-Specific) Uncertainty: Following Levitas & Chi (2010) and
Beckman et al. (2004) I operationalize industry uncertainty by calculating the annual
coefficient of variation for the industry’s monthly stock prices, thus proxying managerial
uncertainty within an industry by creating a measure of industry volatility (Lang &
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Lockhart, 1990). The fundamental approach and rationale to creating this variable is
similar to the dependent variable in this study. I then matched the annual measure to the
alliance data by using the coefficient of variation from the year prior to the alliance
announcement.
Control Variables
Firm size: I control for firm size because prior research suggests that firm size may
explain R&D expenditures and firm performance (Levitas & McFadyen, 2009). R&D
expenditures are especially relevant in this study because of their potential correlation
with exploration and exploitation. I used the natural log of the Client firm’s total assets as
of December 31st of the year prior to the alliance date, which captures both tangible and
intangible assets. Firms in the biopharmaceutical industry firms often do not carry
significant tangible assets but rather intangible assets (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006), and
patents are a form of intangible assets.
Industry environment: I created an industry index based on the Lerner Index (Lerner,
1994) as an indicator of the industry's willingness and ability to fund R&D projects in the
biotech industry (Levitas & McFadyen, 2009). Willingness and ability to fund R&D
projects greatly depend on the macroeconomic environment and industry outlook. There
is less funding available during economic downturns as companies and investors retract
from engaging in risky endeavors, such as R&D. This retraction would then be captured
in this index; hence this measure is an appropriate proxy for the macroeconomic
environment for the purpose of this study.
I calculated the index by using the month-end share price of common stock of a
random sample of 12 biopharmaceutical companies from January 31st,1989 to December

63

31st, and set January 1st, 1989 to 1.000, resulting in a total of 240 industry values (or one
index per month). I then matched those to the alliance date by using the industry index
from the month ending prior to the alliance date.
Firm Age: To control for Client firm age is appropriate because the older the firm,
the higher the probability that it had engaged in the patenting. Therefore age may
influences the variable partner similarity. Firm age is measured in years since the firm’s
founding at the time of the alliance announcement (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006).
R&D Expenditures: This variable is used as an indicator of the firm's R&D
commitment and intensity, which are likely to have an impact on knowledge creation and
subsequently on patenting activity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Leiponen & Helfat, 2010).
I used the Clients’ R&D expense at the end of the year prior to the alliance
announcement.
Tobin’s Q: Tobin’s Q is a measure of intangible resources (Kumar, 2011) and as such
an important factor to control for in a study that uses intangible assets (patents). It is
calculated by dividing the market value of the Client firm (share price at the end of the
year times the number of share outstanding) by the total year-end book value of the focal
firm. I then matched Tobin’s Q to each firm for the year ending prior to the alliance
announcement.
Model and Estimation
I tested the hypotheses using a linear mixed model analysis that examines the effect
of partner similarity and industry uncertainty on firm specific uncertainty of the R&D
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partner in a two-firm alliance. In addition to the two independent variables I included
described above in the regression analysis.
In the sample of 927 alliances, 382 firms account for the (2 x 927 =) 1,854 partners
involved in the alliances. Further, 155 firms appear only once in the sample while one
firm appears 53 times. Because of this unbalanced nature of the sample, as well as the
likely presence of between-subject (firm) specific effects, a standard estimation method
would not be appropriate.
To adjust for the characteristics of the sample, I used a linear mixed model design to
execute the regression analysis that allows the subjects (firms) to differ from one another
(Maxwell & Delaney, 2004). This approach allowed me to introduce random effects for
each of the partner firms. Parameters were estimated by the method of maximum
likelihood using the Proc Mixed procedure in SAS 9.3.
RESULTS
Definitions of variables and the full model specifications are shown in Table 1.
Descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix used in this study are provided in Table 2.
The results of the linear mixed regression analysis are reported in Table 3, where Model 1
serves as the base model, including only the control variables, Model 2 includes the
independent variables, and Model 3 serves as the full model including the interaction
term.
A close examination showed that the dependent variable Firm Uncertainty, as well as
its residuals, is not normally distributed. As a result, I transformed the variable using a
square root transformation. I confirmed the successful transformation by visually
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inspecting the Q-Q plot as well as the P-P plot and deemed the dependent variable as well
as the residuals to be approximately normal.
To assess the threat of collinearity, I estimated the variance inflation factors (VIF)
and found none to be great than 1.227. Several prior studies cite different cutoff values,
and I went with a conservative cutoff value of 10 (Lee, 2011). As a result I conclude that
no linear dependency between the independent variables exists.
A likelihood ratio test, comparing Model 1 to Model 2, produced a chi-square statistic
(χ2 = 2.6, 2 d.f.) below the critical value of 5.991. This suggests that the addition of
Partner Similarity in Model 2 did not significantly improve the model fit from model 1.
Due to this lack of overall explanatory power, and the fact that the regression coefficient
for Partner Similarity in Model 2 is not statistically significant, I reject hypotheses 1 and
2, which suggested that the alliance partner combination in terms of similarity or
complementarity has an impact on firm specific uncertainty as perceived by investors.
The likelihood ratio test comparing Model 1 to Model 3 (which I used to test
hypotheses 3 – 6) produced a chi-square statistic (χ2 = 8.6, 3 d.f.) above the critical value
of 7.815, suggesting that the addition of the three variables in Model 3 did significantly
improve the explanatory power of the model.
Hypotheses 3, 4, 5 and 6 test the effect of partner similarity on firm specific
uncertainty as perceived by investors under differing levels of exogenous uncertainty.
Model 3 in Table 3 shows the regression results pertaining to these hypotheses, indicating
significant findings. Figure 2 displays the relationship between partner similarity and firm
specific uncertainty as perceived by investors under different levels of exogenous
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uncertainty. Note that low partner similarity in the chart suggests partner
complementarity.
Specifically, hypothesis 3 suggested that in an environment of high exogenous
uncertainty investors favor partner complementarity over an alliance partner combination
where the partners display similarity. This relationship is confirmed in Figure 2, which
shows that under high levels of exogenous uncertainty investors prefer partner
complementarity over partner similarity, as evidenced by lower firm specific uncertainty.
Based on the statistically significant findings of Model 3 in Table 3, as well as the
interpretation of the interaction effect in Figure 2, I accept hypothesis 3 and consequently
reject hypothesis 4.
Hypotheses 5 and 6 focus on the relationship between partner similarity and firm
specific uncertainty as perceived by investors under low levels of exogenous uncertainty.
Specifically, hypothesis 5 suggested that under these low levels of exogenous
uncertainty, investors favor partner complementarity over partner similarity. Model 3 in
Table 3 again shows the statistically significant findings. Figure 2 shows that under low
levels of exogenous uncertainty investors prefer similar partners over partners with
complementary skills. As a result, I reject hypothesis 5 but conclude that I found
statistically significant evidence to accept hypothesis 6, which suggests that under low
levels of exogenous uncertainty, investors prefer partners with similar skills.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study was to first investigate if the degree of similarity between
alliance partners affects investors’ perception of uncertainty, as indicated by stock price
volatility. Second, if and how exogenous uncertainty moderates this relationship. I
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focused on dyadic R&D alliances and used their technical expertise as an indicator of
similarity/complementarity. Technical expertise has previously been used in the
management literature as an indicator of partner similarity (see, for example, Ahuja et al.
(2009) or Mari et al. (2010).
I used a linear mixed regression analysis to test the three sets of hypotheses. I found
no support for the first set of hypotheses, which suggested that the degree of partner
similarity should influence investors’ perception of uncertainty. Considering the general
business environment, the findings might actually make great sense in that no firm works
in a vacuum. The external environment should always play a role in a firm’s strategic
decision making process (Larrañeta, Zahra, & González, 2013). As such, investors may
not pay special attention to partner attributes, but rather consider those in context of the
external environment. Hypotheses 3 to 6 specifically consider the external environment.
The results of the second set of hypotheses focused on the interaction between partner
similarity and the level of exogenous uncertainty. I found support for the idea that, when
faced with high levels of exogenous uncertainty, investors prefer alliances with partners
that are less similar, or more complementary, to each other. The findings support the idea
that under high levels of uncertainty, investors prefer alliances that offer greater
flexibility to quickly adapt to a changing environment, which partners with different
skills may be better equipped to achieve than partners with more similar skills. As such,
the findings are in line with previous studies, for example Harrison et al. (2001) which
suggested that resource complementarity, a form of resource broadening, is desirable
under high levels of exogenous uncertainty.
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The findings of this second set of hypotheses might suggest that investors pay close
attention to this dimension of partner choice when a new alliance is announced. Because
a diverse set of partners might be better equipped (meaning they may possess different
skills) to quickly address a volatile external environment, one that demands different
strategic responses to different environmental conditions, investors appear to send a
positive signal to the market and the alliance. Specifically, as suggested by Shah and
Swaminathan (2008), investors may reward the alliance for choosing the right resources
given the external environment, which may signal managerial competence.
The third set of hypotheses investigated investors’ perception of uncertainty under
low levels of exogenous uncertainty. I found statistical support that in a less uncertain
environment, investors prefer alliance partners that are more similar to each other
(hypothesis 6). This might also point to managerial competence because managers have
shown the ability to choose their alliance partners based on skills that match the needs of
the firms in this environment. Specifically, the relative certainty of the external
environment might present the firm with an opportunity to focus on economies of scale,
which in turn might lead to higher efficiencies.
I realize, of course, that this study is not without limitations. First, I used a very
specific dimension of the firm as indicator of partner similarity. Follow up studies might
consider other dimensions on which to compare the partners and measure their relative
distance to each other in an effort to create a more comprehensive indicator of similarity.
Second, while stock market volatility is a common measure of firm and industry
uncertainty, other measures using surveys exist as well. Future studies may want to
consider using a survey method to gauge firm- and industry-specific uncertainty.
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In summary, coding partner similarity and complementarity along a dimension of
technical expertise and in terms of exploration and exploitation is a novel approach that
has not been explored in the management literature. This paper and its findings represent
a valuable contribution to the field of strategic management, and advance our
understanding of investor reaction to alliance announcements.
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Table 1: Definition of variables and model specifications
Variable Name

Definition

Firm Specific
Uncertainty (R&D)

The standardized monthly volatility of the R&D firm’s stock price in the
year prior to the alliance announcement. It is calculated as the natural log
of the coefficient of variation for each R&D firm in the sample.
The standardized monthly volatility of the stock price of a portfolio of 13
biopharmaceutical firms in the year prior to the alliance announcement.
It is calculated as the natural log of the coefficient of variation for the
portfolio of firms.
An indicator of the uniqueness of the technical expertise of the two
partner firms in the focal alliance based on patent citation overlap. A low
value indicates exploration, a high value indicates exploitation.
Control variable, the natural log of total assets of the Client firm
Control variable, an industry index proxying the funding availability in
the focal industry.
Control variable, the age of the client firm from the firm’s founding to
the alliance date.
Control variable,

Exogenous
Uncertainty

Partner Similarity

Size (Client)
Industry Environment
Age (Client)
R&D Expenditures
(Client)
Tobin’s Q (Client)

Control variable

Table 2: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations
Mean

S.D.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

Firm Specific Uncertainty (R&D)

.58

.12

1

2

Partner Similarity

.00

.49

.004

1

3

Exogenous Uncertainty

.00

.03

-.014

.017

1

4

Partner Similarity x Industry Uncertainty

.00

.02

.023

.009

.015

1

5

Size (Client)

7.73

2.54

-.029

.034

-.015

-.058

1

6

Industry Environment

1.46

.31

**

.038

.275

**

.043

.021

1

7

Age (Client)

88.04

226.44

.011

.009

-.050

-.006

-.057

-.065

8

R&D Expenditures (Client)

.034

*

9

Tobin's Q (Client)
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

1233.94
180.98

1980.30
734.08

.259

-.066
.112

.091

-.094

.079

-.069
.064

-.034
-.026

-.182

8

9

*

1

**

.075

1

*

-.009

-.063

.127

1

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Statistics estimated using centered values of variables involved in interaction
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Table 3: Maximum Likelihood Estimates on Firm Specific Uncertainty of Technical Expertise Similarity
Model 1
Firm Uncertainty (R&D)
Intercept
Partner Similarity
Exogenous Uncertainty
Partner Similarity x Industry Uncertainty
Size (Client)
Industry Environment
Age (Client)
R&D Expenditures (Client)
Tobin's Q (Client)
Log-likelihood ratio
Log-likelihood ratio vs. Model 1
N

0.501 (0.053)

-0.000
0.054
0.000
0.000
0.000
-261.4
183

(0.003)
(0.029)†
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)

Model 2
Firm Uncertainty (R&D)
0.486 (0.053)
-0.013 (0.018)
-0.398 (0.280)
-0.000
0.065
0.000
0.000
0.000
-264
2.6
183

(0.003)
(0.030)†
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)

Model 3
Firm Uncertainty (R&D)
0.470
-0.007
-0.358
1.350
0.000
0.074
0.000
0.000
0.000

(0.053)***
(0.018)
(0.276)
(0.543)*
(0.003)
(0.030)†
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)

-270
8.6 *
183

Standard errors appear in parentheses
†p<0.10; *p>0.05; **p>0.01; ***p>0.001
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Figure 1: Relationship between partner similarity and firm specific uncertainty under low
and high levels of exogenous uncertainty (hypotheses 3 to 6).
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SPILLOVER EFFECTS IN ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS
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INTRODUCTION
We know that when firms enter alliances they do so in an attempt to unlock possible
synergistically driven advantages, such as access to new markets (Chen & Chen, 2002;
Koka & Prescott, 2008), access to new assets (Huggins, 2010; Li, Eden, Hitt, & Ireland,
2008), or to pursue an increase in legitimacy (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, & Borza,
2000), just to name a few. The skills and expertise of the partners are factors that
determine the extent to which the alliance will be able to succeed. Alliances are formed at
least partially because the partner firms are attracted to each other because of potentially
synergistic effects achieved by combining their resources. However, inviting another
entity into a formal cooperation connects the firms in such a way that both positive and
negative actions by one partner may now spill over and affect the other partner.
In this study, I will examine how an action by one of the alliance partners - to enter a
new, additional alliance while still engaged in the original base alliance - affects the
other, original partner. The literature suggests that firms seek multiple alliance partners
for two main reasons: 1) to maximize their influence within a network, and 2) to reduce
uncertainty by maximizing their access to strategic capabilities (Burgers, Hill, & Kim,
1993). The question I ask here goes beyond the motivation for this behavior, but rather
addresses how entering an additional alliance by one partner will affect the other, initial,
alliance partner? I will focus on two-firm alliances in the biotech-pharmaceutical arena in
which multiple simultaneous alliances are not uncommon, and examine how an
additional alliance by one original partner impacts the stock price of the other original
partner.
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Ample resources have been devoted to study the stock market reaction to a new
alliance announcement on the partner firms (Oxley, Sampson, & Silverman, 2009). Most,
though not all, of the literature suggests that these alliance announcements trigger a
positive stock market reaction (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Dyer, Kale, & Singh, 2001; Shah
& Swaminathan, 2008). In addition, the complex nature of the innovation process in this
industry may suggest that simultaneous engagement in multiple alliances to access new
knowledge is a vital part of the firm strategy (Hess & Rothaermel, 2011). The
combination of the positive stock market reaction and the desire to gain access to new
knowledge in order to stay competitive may entice firms to enter multiple alliances,
possibly without much regard to how this will affect older, yet still active, alliance
partners.
My research question is as follows: Given that firm A and firm B are currently in an
active alliance, how does the market react to the information that firm A has entered (or
is entering) into a new alliance with firm C? Specifically, how does this information of a
new alliance affect the market price of the initial partner (firm B)?
For early clarification purposes, I am focusing on two alliances: the base alliance (or
initial alliance) and the new alliance. I define the pharmaceutical company currently in
the base alliance as PBase. This is the alliance partner that will enter into a new alliance.
BBase represents the biotech firm currently in the base alliance. This is the partner whose
share price I will monitor to detect changes due to PBase entering into a new alliance with
BNew. BNew is the biotech firm that will enter into a new alliance with PBase.
Because many factors may influence the market’s reaction to the new alliance
announcement, it is not clear whether the market’s response to a new alliance
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announcement will be positive or negative from the perspective of the initial alliance
partner. To further study contributing factors, I will pay special attention to how the
market considers one specific factor when valuing BBase. Specifically, I hypothesize that
whether the new alliance will operate in the same therapeutic class as the base alliance
will have an impact on the valuation of BBase. Using signaling theory (Spence, 1973;
Spence, 1974) as theoretical foundation to derive my hypotheses, I suggest that the
market could conceivably react positively or negatively, which results in two sets of
competing hypotheses.
I aim to contribute to the literature by furthering our understanding of how the market
interprets signals sent by one party, transfers the decoded information, and applies the
new knowledge to other entities. By entering a new alliance, the partner PBase may
conceivably signal that the base alliance was not likely to generate the desired outcomes
and, as a result, PBase decided to move on and shift resources to a new alliance (which
may result in a negative market reaction to BBase). However, the same action of entering a
new alliance could conceivably signal that the base alliance is in such an advanced stage
and path toward success that it will thrive despite a now somewhat divided attention of
resources by PBase (which might result in a positive market reaction to BBase). I am using a
unique sample of biopharmaceutical alliances to test my hypotheses.
The following section provides an overview of the literature and theory of alliance
formation, leading to the hypotheses that I will test in this study. Subsequent sections will
show the empirical analyses and findings. I will conclude with a discussion of the
implications and limitations of this study.
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Alliances have received a strong focus in the management literature. This
organizational form may be defined as a formal cooperative agreement between two or
more organizations, involving the pooling or trading of resources, with or without equity.
The current study focuses fundamentally on market reactions to a new alliance
announcement. Assuming that the investors have the ability to identify and decode
signals sent by the involved parties, investors react to the announcement of a new alliance
based on their interpretation of how this strategic action will impact the future
performance of the involved parties.
Alliances are generally thought of as a performance catalyst for the partner firms. By
inviting an independent entity (partner firm) to share resources, alliance partners signal
that they believe that they might be able to generate synergistically driven outcomes
(Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1991), which may ultimately lead to an increase in
their market value. Several studies have focused on the direct, immediate stock market
effect on the partner firms entering an alliance [see Burton (2005)].
In this study, however, I am looking beyond the direct effect on the partner firms
announcing the new alliance (PBase and BNew); I focus on how a new (additional) alliance
announcement will affect an old, existing, initial partner (BBase). Since the base alliance
partners are still in an active alliance, I would suggest that the initial partner (BBase),
although not directly involved in creating the new alliance (between PBase and BNew), will
be affected by its partner’s action to enter into a new alliance. How will investors react to
the new alliance announcement, and thereby affect this initial partner?
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Owners (investors) generally lack some knowledge of firm operations in comparison
to managers, which exposes the investors to information asymmetry. Signaling theory
(Spence, 1973; Spence, 1974) has been used to addresses issues concerning information
asymmetry between owners and managers. The theory suggests that in the absence of
perfect information, reading signals can reduce said information asymmetry, which
would in turn impact the valuation of the firm or alliance by the investors. I suggest that
by entering into a new alliance with a specific partner that will contribute certain
expertise and experiences (here, experience in the therapeutic class), PBase sends a signal
to the market. The question is how the market will interpret these signals.
Because selecting the right partner is crucial to the success of an alliance, past studies
have focused on issues surrounding the partner selection process (Beckman, Haunschild,
& Phillips, 2004; Dollinger, Golden, & Saxton, 1997; Hitt et al., 2000; Kale & Singh,
2009; Shah & Swaminathan, 2008). Especially partner characteristics that may benefit
the alliance are an important consideration when choosing the right partner, one that will
help create synergistic effects and, possibly, the desired increase in value. The range of
areas within the firms that could benefit from the synergistic effects of the alliance
formation can include all functional areas of the firm. For example, as mentioned above,
alliances generally create an initial positive shock to the partners’ market value (Dyer et
al., 2001; Shah & Swaminathan, 2008), thereby positively influencing the finance
department of a firm. Other studies have found positive effects on operations (Anand &
Khanna, 2000), marketing (Swaminathan & Moorman, 2009), or R&D (Rothaermel,
2001). Because synergistic effects can be created in different types of alliances, I am not
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limiting this study to only one type, but rather include all types of alliances (e.g., R&D,
marketing).
Because of these possible benefits to various functional departments, we have seen an
increasing trend toward alliance formation in certain industries such as automotive,
banking, or telecommunication (Garcia-Pont, 2006). Firms recognize the potential to reap
the benefits of an increased market valuation, as well as an increase in long-term
performance measures. Wanting to reach the maximum potential performance, managers
may be inclined to enter into and actively work on several alliances at the same time.
This is a form of diversification; especially in the pharmaceutical industry, in which the
costs for a new approved therapy are high, but the potential (financial benefits) are even
higher, firms may choose to work on several therapies at the same time so as to create
several possible income streams.
Clearly, however, not all alliances succeed, and the threat of failure impacts investor
perceptions. Research suggests that a significant number of alliances, in fact, between
30% and 70%, fail or are prematurely terminated (Bamford, Gomes-Casseres, &
Robinson, 2003; Lunnan & Haugland, 2008), leading to a destruction of shareholder
value of the alliance partners (Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002). This would suggest that
investors ought to be cautious regarding how to react to a new announcement. While
partner firms may enter the alliance with the desire to create synergistic effects, I note
that entering into an alliance does not guarantee that the partners are able to take
advantage of synergistic possibilities.
Some studies have noted that entering into additional alliances, while a form of
diversification, may in fact impact the value of other, existing partnerships. For example,
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Rothaermel & Deeds (2006) suggested an inverted U-shaped relationship between the
number of R&D alliances in a firm’s portfolio and the innovative output of said alliances.
The authors attribute this relationship to the fact that managerial and financial resources
are finite, and the more alliances a firm manages, the more strained the resources, leading
to information-processing overload (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997; Zahra, Ireland, &
Hitt, 2000). In other words, too many alliances might lead to a reduction in productivity,
which in turn might be recognized by the investors. As a result, the investors might
change the value of some or all involved firms.
I believe, however, that it would be an oversimplification to suggest simply that the
latest (newest) alliances would always suffer the most from this decline in productivity.
Partner firms might assign priority / importance to certain alliances regardless of the
timing of their formation. Therefore, I note that the number of alliances is an important
variable to consider, but to make a general statement concerning the resource allocation
to the initial alliances, which might affect the productivity and, in turn, the valuation of
the partner firms, might not be possible. For now, I note that entering into multiple
alliances can have a positive or a negative spillover effect on existing alliance partners. I
will now move on and introduce an additional dimension which I suggest is important to
consider when predicting how investors will react to a new alliance announcement and
subsequently change the valuation of BBase.
The first set of hypotheses concentrates on a scenario in which the new alliance has a
focus in the same therapeutic class as the base alliance. For example, if the base alliance
with PBase and BBase is working on a cancer therapy, then I will analyze new alliances of
PBase that are also working on a cancer-related therapy and study the effect of the new
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alliances on BBase. Will the market be influenced by the fact that the old and new alliances
operate in the same therapeutic class?
Several organizational capabilities can act as signals to the market as to whether the
alliance might be successful or not. Learning is one of those capabilities (Nelson &
Winter, 1982). With learning comes experience, and having alliance experience
(including, for example, managing partners, managing resources, writing alliance
contracts, having spent resources in a specific therapeutic class, etc.) that could make the
alliance more efficient, leading, ceteris paribus, to a higher probability of success.
Therefore, having relevant experience in the specific focus of the alliance should send
signals that would impact the market’s reaction to the new alliance announcement. In
other words, experience might influence investors’ perception of value if it is used as a
decodable signal.
If the new alliance has a similar focus (defined as operating in the same therapeutic
class) to that of the base alliance, then it could be suggested that the partners of the new
alliance might benefit from the experience already developed by PBase. I would expect
that fewer resources will have to be employed to learn and generate experiences, which
should lead to higher efficiencies and a higher probability of success for the new alliance.
This might be a positive development for the base alliance in that PBase could
conceptually leave more resources in the base alliance, which would suggest that the base
alliance might not be as negatively affected by the new alliance (and the potential
corresponding resource drain). In fact, I suggest that this scenario might affect the base
alliance positively in that the learning and experience from the new alliance might
actually spill back to the base alliance, therefore benefiting said base alliance. I will
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denote the new alliance partner of PBase working on a therapy in the same therapeutic
class as the base alliance as BNewSTC. I suggest that it is possible that:

Hypothesis 1A: The announcement of a new alliance between PBase and BNewSTC
operating in the same therapeutic class as the base alliance will positively affect the
share price of BBase.
However, if the new alliance operates in the same therapeutic class as the base
alliance it might potentially signal to the market that the base alliance was either on a
trajectory that PBase does not believe will lead to the desired results (hence the action to
enter into a new alliance and to start shifting resources toward a potentially more
successful venture; the benefit of being able to diversify), or simply that BNewSTC is a more
desirable partner. It is beyond the scope of this study to analyze exactly why the market
decodes this signal as negative, but I suggest that it is possible that the market decodes
the action by PBase to enter a new alliance as a signal that the base alliance was not
believed to have the potential to create the desired success or that some firms are trying to
play their partners off against each other. Any of these reasons might negatively affect
the market value of BBase, and in this case I would expect to see evidence that:

Hypothesis 1B: The announcement of a new alliance between PBase and BNewSTC
operating in the same therapeutic class as the base alliance will negatively affect the
share price of BBase.
The second set of hypotheses focuses on a scenario in which the new alliance has a
focus that is in a different therapeutic class than the base alliance, whereas I will denote
the new alliance partner of PBase as BNewDTC. The signal that the announcement of a new
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alliance sends could again be interpreted either positively or negatively as it pertains to
the base alliance, and subsequently to BBase, the focus of this study.
The same basic arguments used in developing the first set of hypotheses apply.
However, with the new alliance operating in a different therapeutic class than the base
alliance, any advantage that the market may have considered to be present in the first set
of hypotheses is now not present; the benefits of the new alliance operating in the same
therapeutic class as the initial alliance are non-existent. As a result, the market may look
for additional signals to interpret. How will the new alliance impact BBase? For example,
branching out and deciding to enter into an alliance which, from the outside, may have
fewer positive spillover effects than the scenarios in hypotheses 1A and 1B (i.e., working
on two therapeutic classes may have fewer synergistic aspects than working on two
projects within the same therapeutic class in two different alliances), may also potentially
send two different signals, one positive and one negative.
Let’s start with the positive signal. A new alliance operating in a different therapeutic
class may signal that the base alliance is on a path that allows PBase to shift resources to
the new alliance, despite the lower potential for positive spillovers due to the different
therapeutic classes. Therefore, when PBase enters into a new alliance that operates in a
different therapeutic class than the base alliance, it may be an even stronger signal that
the base alliance is on a path toward success and would be able to absorb the strain of
PBase dividing its attention and resources between the two alliances. Because investors
won’t have access to perfect information, they will have to rely on other signals and
interpret them. Here, I suggest that PBase entering into a new alliance will signal that the
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base alliance is on a trajectory toward success, and I would consequently expect to
observe that:

Hypothesis 2A: The announcement of a new alliance between PBase and BNewDTC
operating in a different therapeutic class as the base alliance will positively affect the
share price of BBase.
The same signal, PBase entering a new alliance focused on a different therapeutic class
than the base alliance, may also be interpreted as a negative signal as it pertains to the
base alliance and subsequently BBase. Investors could potentially interpret this signal as a)
that the base alliance has not made the desired progress toward a successful, marketable
therapy; b) that BBase is not a desirable partner; and/or that c) the base alliance does not
have the necessary resources to successfully develop a new therapy in the focal class.
Generating a positive return on investment ought to be the ultimate goal of the
alliance. Depending on the purpose of the alliance (e.g. R&D, marketing, etc.), success
may be defined differently. It goes beyond the scope of this paper as it pertains to
hypotheses 2A and 2B to define success. I merely suggest that investors who accept the
fact that PBase will enter into an alliance with a different focus than the initial alliance will
potentially decode this signal as negative as it affects BBase because it may delay or cancel
any potential future success. As a result I suggest that:

Hypothesis 2B: The announcement of a new alliance between PBase and BNewDTC
operating in a different therapeutic class as the base alliance will negatively affect
the share price of BBase.
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METHODS
Sample
I used a sample of bilateral alliances that include biotech firms and pharmaceutical
companies. The sample identified the firms as either pharmaceutical or biotech partner.
Data were taken from Compustat data files, the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) U.S. stock database, the Recombinant Capital Biotechnology Database (ReCap),
the IMS R&D Focus database, Spectrum Institutional Ownership files, and United States
Securities and Exchange (SEC) proxy (DEF 14a) filings.
The initial sample included 28,470 biopharmaceutical alliances established between
January 1st, 1989 and December 31st, 2008. I used the Wharton Research Data Services
(WRDS), and specifically, the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database, to
determine which alliances included both biotech firms and pharmaceutical firms that
were publicly traded at the end of the month of the event date. Next I further refined the
event date (date of the alliance announcement) by performing a web search on each
partner combination in the stated month; this search produced specific alliance
announcements which allowed me to identify the exact date of the announcement; this
date was then used to construct the three-day window to measure the cumulative
abnormal return. Next, I identified all instances in which the pharmaceutical company
entered into a subsequent alliance with a different biotech firm. I then used the
therapeutic class as indicator of whether this new alliance operated in the same
therapeutic class as the base alliance, or not. Data availability constraints limited the final
sample used in this analysis to a total of 258 new alliances, of which 67 alliances did
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operate in the same therapeutic class and 191 alliances did not operate in the same
therapeutic class as the base alliance.
Measures
The variable used to conduct the test of difference between alliances based on their
respective therapeutic classes is the sum of the abnormal stock returns (cumulative
abnormal returns, or CAR) of BBase around the time of the alliance announcement
between PBase and BNew. CAR represents the deviation between the realized return,
measured by the biotech firm’s actual stock price movement, and the expected return of
the biotech firm’s stock performance. CAR has been used extensively as a performance
measure in joint venture event studies (Gulati, Lavie, & Singh, 2009; Koh &
Venkatraman, 1991; Park & Kim, 1997; Reuer & Koza, 2000) and as a dependent
variable in alliance studies (Anand & Khanna, 2000).
I calculated the expected return by using a benchmark portfolio comprised of sizeadjusted firms that match the 4-digit SIC code of the sample industry. I monitored the
return of both the portfolio and the biotech firm during a three-day window [-1, 0, 1]
around the alliance announcement and calculated the cumulative different over the three
days as the difference between the two cumulative returns. The short three-day window
was chosen in an attempt to isolate the news of the alliance announcement and help
prevent the inclusion of non-alliance related news in the movement of the securities [see,
for example, Lee et al.(2000)], thus following the argument of market efficiency. I then
matched the calculated CAR values by firm ID and date to focal biotech firms.
Whether the future alliance operated in the same or a different therapeutic class as the
base alliance is the variable that distinguishes the two different groups of CAR values in
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this study. I only considered alliances in which the pharmaceutical company chose a
different biotech partner than the base alliance. In addition I only included new alliances
that were announced within three years of the announcement of the base alliance;
alliances are generally thought-of as active for an average of three years. If the base
alliance operated in the same therapeutic class as the new alliance, I coded the variable as
1, otherwise 0.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for CAR of BBase at the time of the
announcement of a new alliance between PBase and BNew. Results of the t-test tests of
differences in means of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of BBase at the time of PBase
entering into a new alliance with BNew focusing on the same therapeutic class, or not, can
be found in Table 2. I used a benchmark portfolio consisting of firms within the same 4digit SIC code as the focal firm to calculate CAR.
I first tested for the presence of cumulative abnormal returns by testing whether the
mean of CAR is statistically significantly different from 0 regardless of the therapeutic
class. A t-test confirmed that CAR is statistically significant different from 0 at ∝ = 0.05
(one-sample t(257) = 4.223, p < 0.0001) with a mean difference from 0 of 0.044.

I next computed the mean for the subsample of CAR values for both a) instances in
which the new alliance operated in the same therapeutic class as the base alliance, and b)
instances in which the new alliance operated in a different therapeutic class as the base
alliance.
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The findings show that if the new alliance operates in the same therapeutic class as
the base alliance, the mean cumulative abnormal return of BBase at the time of the
announcement of the new alliance is positive (0.044). As a result, I reject hypothesis 1B
which suggested that the announcement of a new alliance would negatively affect the
share price of BBase. Next, I tested whether this positive mean difference is statistically
significantly different from 0. A t-test showed that t(67) = 1.822, p = 0.073, suggesting
that the positive difference between 0.044 and 0 is marginally statistically significant at
the 0.10 level. As a result I accept hypothesis 1A which states that the announcement of a
new alliance between PBase and BNewSTC operating in the same therapeutic class as the
base alliance will positively affect the share price of BBase.
The mean cumulative abnormal return for BBase at the time of the announcement of a
new alliance that is not operating in the same therapeutic class is positive as well (0.043).
I therefore reject hypothesis 2B which suggested that the announcement of a new alliance
in a different therapeutic class would negatively affect the share price of BBase. The t-test
showed that t(191) = 3.926, p < 0.0001), suggesting that the positive difference between
0.043 and 0 is statistically highly significant. I therefore accept hypothesis 2A which
states that the announcement of a new alliance between PBase and BNewDTC operating in a
different therapeutic class from that of the base alliance will positively affect the share
price of BBase.
As a result, the findings of the t-test support the hypotheses that investors react in a
positive way to the announcement of a new alliance between PBase and BNew. The result
holds in both instances in which the new alliance operates in the same class and when it
does not operate in the same class.
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In addition to this appropriate test for the stated hypotheses I performance a post-hoc
analysis (linear mixed regression) using the therapeutic class as a dummy variable in an
effort to gain a better understanding of whether the therapeutic class of the new alliance
matters to investors when they react to alliance announcements. Variable descriptions,
descriptive statistics and the results of the linear mixed regression can be found in
Appendix A. Table 3 shows the variable description, Table 4 shows the descriptive
statistics and correlation matrix, and Table 5 shows the result of maximum likelihood
estimates on CAR of therapeutic class. The findings provide marginal evidence at the 0.1
level that the therapeutic class does matter when investors react to the alliance
announcement.
The fact that the market valuation changes upon the announcement of a new alliance
involving PBase is interesting for several reasons. First, it suggests that investors monitor
events impacting firms that are not directly involved in an event (here, the announcement
of the new alliance). Thus investors may consider spillover effects to be real and
important.
Second, the investors appear to react more strongly to instances in which the new
alliance operates in a same therapeutic class than the original alliance. PBase entering into
a new alliance with a different focus may signal to investors that the original alliance may
have already or possibly will produce a marketable product.
Third, the fact that the new alliance announcement, although not directly involving
BBase, results in a positive market reaction regardless of the therapeutic class may provide
additional evidence to prior studies that have found that the market usually reacts
positively to new alliance announcements (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Dyer et al., 2001;
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Shah & Swaminathan, 2008). An interesting follow-up study could focus further on how
far beyond the directly involved partners this positive impact reaches.
I should point out some limitations in this study. First, while prior studies suggested
that learning as an organizational capability may be closely tied to prior experience
(Nelson & Winter, 1982), and thus represent a positive asset of the firm, failure of prior
alliances may send a strong negative signal. My data did not contain any direct
information on the success of (prior) alliances, which is very difficult to define and
measure. Earlier studies have used indirect measures, such as previous alliance
experience (Anand & Khanna, 2000). Future studies may focus on a way to measure and
code success of alliances directly.
Second, the available data listed the therapeutic class, which clearly is a focus in this
study, based on a press release at the time of the alliance formation. There is no guarantee
that the focus (e.g. therapeutic class) did not change over time. As such, investors may in
fact have more updated information than the available data contains.

CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study was to investigate whether investors monitor post-alliance
events (i.e., the announcement of a new alliance), interpret the signal, and react to them. I
derived hypotheses that suggested that investors react to post-alliance events, and that the
focus of the alliance (i.e., therapeutic class) may matter. The statistical analysis suggests
that investors do, in fact, react in a statistically significant way to the new alliance. The
market valuation of the initial partner increases upon the announcement of a new alliance.
A post hoc analysis also showed that the therapeutic class matters to investors. Further
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analysis is needed to better understand when and how (in which context) the focus of the
new alliance matters to investors when adjusting the market value of the initial alliance
partners.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Std.
Error
CAR when in same Therapeutic Class

N
67

Mean
.044

SD
.197

Mean
.024

CAR when NOT in same Therapeutic Class

191

.043

.152

.011

Table 2: One Sample T-Tests
Test Value = 0

CAR when in same Therapeutic Class

t
1.822

df
66

Sig. (2tailed)
.073

Mean
Diff.
.044

CAR when NOT in same Therapeutic Class

3.926

190

.000

.043

95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Lower
-.004

Upper
.092

.021

.065
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Appendix
Table 3: Definition of variables
Variable Name

Definition

CAR (R&D)

The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of the R&D partner, calculated
using a portfolio of firms with the same 2-digit SIC code, adjusted for
size and transformed (ln) to adjust for non-normality of the data and the
residuals.
An binary variable, based on whether the therapeutic class of the base
alliance is the same as the new alliance; 1 = indicates same as base
alliance, 0 = not same as base alliance.
An indicator of the uniqueness of the technical expertise of the two
partner firms in the focal alliance based on patent citation overlap. A low
value indicates exploration, a high value indicates exploitation.
An index describing the level of relationship experience between the two
partners, calculated as = (Frequency) + (Recency) + (ATSPE); a low
value indicates exploration, a high value indicates exploitation.
The number or frequency of prior alliance relationships between the two
firms
The recency (in days) of the last alliance relationship between the two. If
the two partners have not worked before I set the value to 10,000
The alliance type specific partner experience, indicating if these two
firms have worked together in this type of alliance before.
An index describing the FDA approval process experience of the alliance
partners at the time of the alliance date, calculated as ((C-MKT-Index +
RD-MKT-Index) x (Alliance Success)). A low value indicates
exploration, a high value indicates exploitation.
The cumulative FDA approval process experience of the Client firm in
each stage of the process and across all stages at the time of the alliance.
The cumulative FDA approval process experience of the R&D firm in
each stage of the process and across all stages at the time of the alliance.
The cumulative FDA approval success of the two partners.
Control variable, an industry index proxying the funding availability in
the focal industry.
Control variable, the age of the client firm from the firm’s founding to
the alliance date.
Control variable, the age of the R&D firm from the firm’s founding to
the alliance date
Control variable, the number of current active alliances of the client firm
as of the event date.
Control variable, the number of current active alliances of the R&D firm
as of the event date.

Therapeutic Class

Technical Expertise

Relationship
Expertise
Frequency
Recency
ATSPE
Market Expertise

C-MKT-Index
RD-MKT-Index
Alliance Success
Industry Environment
Age (Client)
Age (R&D)
Active Alliances
(Client)
Active Alliances
(R&D)

Table 2: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations
Mean
1

CAR

2

S.D.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

-.437

.211

1

Therapeutic Class

.284

.452

.061

1

3

Technical Expertise

.426

.494

.074

.035

1

4

Relationship Expertise

-8666.106

3264.722

**

-.021

-.080

1

5

Marketing Expertise

510.110

1125.814

.086*

.074

.069

-.032

1

*

.057

.009

1
-.057

6

Industry Index

7

-.320

9

10

1.465

.319

-.029

-.064

Age (Client)

71.168

85.372

.019

.075

.046

-.008

-.004

8

Age (R&D)

20.868

101.413

-.007

-.026

.061

-.007

-.020

.014

.009

1

9

Active Alliances (Client)

28.529

28.511

-.005

.081

.047

-.039

-.005

-.079*

.087*

-.022

1

-.015

*

-.026

*

-.025

-.007

.085*

10

Active Alliances (RD)
13.081
16.870
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

.101

.093

8

.059

-.004

.070

1

1

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Table 3: Maximum Likelihood estimates on CAR of Therapeutic Class

Explanatory Variable

Model 1
CAR

Active Alliances (R&D)

-0.693
0.042
-0.005
-0.000
-0.000
0.063
-0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Log-likelihood ratio
N

-146.7
244

Intercept
Therapeutic Class
Technical Expertise
Relationship Expertise
Marketing Expertise
Industry Index
Age (Client)
Age (R&D)
Active Alliances (Client)

Standard errors appear in parentheses
†p<0.10; *p>0.05; **p>0.01; ***p>0.001

(0.072)***
(0.025)†
(0.023)
(0.000)***
(0.000)
(0.039)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.004)
(0.000)

107
Matthias Bollmus

Research Interests:
Strategic Alliances, Real Options, Knowledge Transfer, Financial Flexibility
Education:
University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee
Sheldon B. Lubar School of Business
Ph.D. in Organizations and Strategic Management, Finance minor

2009 - Present

Passed oral defense of three-paper dissertation proposal 08/2012
Anticipated graduation 08/2013

University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee
Sheldon B. Lubar School of Business
MBA, Finance Emphasis, summa cum laude

2005 - 2007

Carroll University
B.A. International Relations, Business Administration (Mgmt.
Emphasis), Organizational Leadership, summa cum laude

2000 - 2002

Full Time Faculty Appointment:
Carroll University, Instructor of Business
Conference Presentations:
Alliance Success: Firm Characteristics and Reputation (with Dr. M.
Ahsan, Dr. E. Levitas, and Dr. Ann McFadyen) , AOM in Boston, August
2012.
Redding, Bollmus & Cropper: Cultivating Meaningful Student Reflection:
High- and Low- Tech Models. NAFSA Region V conference, November
2nd – 4th, 2011
Wyland, Freimark, Bollmus & Hedrich: Corporate Illegal Behavior as an
Unanticipated Consequence of Philanthropy. Southwest Academy of
Management Conference, March 9th – 12th, 2011.

Publications:
Levitas, E & M. Bollmus. 2013. Options and Strategic Management. In
Strategic Management. Strategic Management in the 21st Century, 3: 108125. T.J. Wilkinson (ed.) Praeger Publishers.

2007 - Present

108

Wyland, Bollmus, Freimark & Hedrich. Forthcoming. Corporate Illegal
Behavior as an Unanticipated Consequence of Philanthropy. Journal of
Leadership, Accountability, and Ethics.
Work in Progress:
Rapid Overreaction: Perceived Value Creation via Alliance
Announcements
Reducing Investor Anxiety via Alliance Partner Selection
Spillover Effects in Alliance Relationships
Beyond exploration and exploitation: What firm characteristics make firms
radical or moderate compared to their peers? Bollmus, Matthias; Levitas,
Edward.
Professional Activities:
Member, Academy of Management
Courses Taught:
Business Policy (UG capstone)
Business Policy and Strategy (MBA capstone)
Principals of Management
Principals of Finance
Investment Management
Financial Accounting
Managerial Accounting
Culture and Diversity in Organizations
Leadership: Theory and Practice
Contemporary Germany: Its Culture, Economy and Politics (prep course and in-country experience)
Institutional Service:
Member, MBA Admissions Committee
Member, Program, Curriculum and Assessment Committee
Member, Strategic Planning Subcommittee for BAE
Member, Campus Services Committee

2011 - Present
2010 - 2013
2012 - 2013
2007 - 2010

Relevant Work Experience:
Napkin Innovations, L.L.C., Owner
Director of Wholesale Services & Secondary Market Manager
Amerihome Mortgage Company, L.L.C.

2009 - Present
2002 - 2007

